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The Case Against Same-Sex Marriage in Canada:
Law and Policy Considerations
Jane Adolphe*

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper was presented at the conference: The Future of Same-Sex
Marriage Claims: The Third Generation and Beyond, held at J. Reuben
Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. As a result, it caters to an
American audience and provides basic information about the Canadian
legal framework so that the issues pertaining to same-sex marriage may
be more readily appreciated. Let us now turn to a brief summary of the
pertinent events and then discuss the outline of this paper.
On June 17, 2003, Prime Minister Jean Chretien1 announced the
drafting of a new law2 that would allow for same-sex marriage.3 The
This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium”
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young
University. The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark
Law School, or Brigham Young University.
*
Jane F. Adolphe is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Ave Maria School of Law. She holds
common law and civil law degrees (LL.B. /B.C.I) from McGill University in Montreal, Quebec as
well as degrees in canon law (J.C.L./J.C.D.) from the Pontifica Universita della Santa Croce in
Rome, Italy. She would like to thank her research assistant Krista Van Amerongen as well as those
who took the time to read and comment on the paper such as Professor Charles Rice, Professor
Bruce Frohnen, Professor Robert George, Father Ignacio Barrerio and Edwards Adolphe, Q.C.
1. The Governor General, the Queen’s representative, governs, except in rare cases, on the
advice of the cabinet led by a Prime Minister who chooses his cabinet ministers (usually 30 or more)
from among the elected members of his own party who are, in turn, formally appointed by the
Governor General. The cabinet ministers, who exercise executive authority, are collectively
responsible to the House of Commons for policy and performing duties through the various federal
departments, agencies, commissions, boards and state-owned corporations; as a general rule “[i]f a
Minister does not agree with a particular policy or action of the Government, he or she must either
accept the policy or action, and if necessary, defend it or resign from the Cabinet.” EUGENE A.
FORSEY, HOW CANADIANS GOVERN THEMSELVES, 1, 5-6 (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Canada, 5th ed. 2003), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/idb/forsey/toc-e.asp.
2. No bill or proposed law actually becomes law without having been approved by the
House, the Senate, and then assented to by the Governor General. When a bill is initiated in the
House, by either a cabinet member or private member, the bill must pass through three readings. At
the first reading, the bill is introduced to House members but not debated. The second reading
involves a general debate on the bill, which is then voted on. If passed, the bill goes to a
parliamentary committee for consideration, where witnesses are heard, clauses are examined,
amendments are made, and a report drafted. At the third reading, a brief debate ensues on the
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draft bill, An Act Respecting Certain Aspects of Legal Capacity for
Marriage, is presently before the Supreme Court of Canada for review. It
defines marriage as “the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of
others” and allows for religious groups to decide whether or not to
solemnize same-sex marriages. Three questions have been put to the
Supreme Court of Canada: “Does Parliament have the exclusive legal
authority to define marriage? Is the proposed act compatible with the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Does the Constitution protect religious
leaders who refuse to sanctify same-sex marriage?” 4 After the Justices
decide the case in the fall, the draft bill will be put to a free vote in
Parliament.5 This means that members of the Prime Minister’s Liberal
party, which dominates the House of Commons by a majority, need not
vote along party lines.6
The draft bill is said to reflect Canada’s evolution as a society, that
is, the changing of her values toward a greater recognition of the equality
and dignity of the human person. In the words of Justice Minister Martin
Cauchon, “Society is not static. It’s in constant evolution. It’s a question
of dignity. It’s a question of equality.”7 Confident that the draft bill will
pass, but anticipating obstacles, Cauchon encouraged provinces to move
immediately and act according to the draft bill. Presently, however, only
Ontario and British Columbia have performed same-sex marriages.8
The draft bill is a response to the latest decision in a trilogy of cases
considering same-sex marriage in the provinces of Quebec, British
amended bill, which is then put to a vote. If this reading carries, the bill goes to the Senate and a
similar process is repeated there. Once accepted by the Senate, which is generally the case, the bill
then must receive royal assent from the Governor General. FORSEY, supra note 1, at 35, 45-46).
3. Colin McClelland, Same Sex Marriage Endorsed in Canada Government Will Act to
Change Law THE WASH. POST, 18 June 2003, p. A22 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A7004-2003Jun17.html.
4. CBC News, Ottawa Drafts Same-sex Marriage Law, at http://www.cbc.ca/stories/
2003/07/17/marriage_030717 (last updated Jun. 18, 2003).
5. House of Commons consists of elected representatives or members, who receive the
largest number of votes, in each of the country’s respective electoral constituencies, which total
about 301. The number of representatives is roughly proportional to the population of each province
or territory: Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, New Foundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Northwest Territories, Yukon
Territories, Nunavut. Parliamentary candidates may run as members of a recognized party or as
independents. The party that wins the largest seats in the House of Commons forms the government
and the party leader is then appointed as Prime Minister by the Governor General. The Members of
the Senate, or Upper House, on the other hand, are selected from the Western Provinces, Ontario,
Quebec, the Atlantic Provinces, and the territories and are appointed by the Governor-General on
recommendation of the Prime Minister. FORSEY, supra note 1, at 37-38. For details on specific
regions in Canada see for example, Government of Canada: Provinces and Territories, at
http://canada.gc.ca/ othergov/prov_e.html (2003).
6. CBC News, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Columbia, and Ontario. On June 10, 2003, the Ontario Court of Appeal
released Halpern v. Canada,9 the last judgment in a trilogy of cases
addressing the same-sex marriage issue. Halpern is the most significant
of the these cases since the Court had the benefit of reviewing the
reasoning of the other two cases in the trilogy, namely the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (A.G.),
released in May 2003,10 and the Superior Court of Quebec in Hendricks
v. Quebec (A.G), released in September 2002.11 In all three cases, after
their applications for marriage licenses had been denied, same-sex
couples commenced a civil action in their respective jurisdictions. The
Court, in each of the three cases, held that the prohibition against samesex marriage contravened s. 15 (1) of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, namely, the equal protection provision, and could not be
saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit.
In Hendricks, Justice Lemelin of the Quebec Superior Court declared
the statutory bars to same-sex marriage to be in breach of the Charter and
to have no force and effect; at the same time, he stayed the declaration
for a two-year period to allow Parliament to remedy the situation. In
reference to Art. 5 of the Federal Harmonization Act, the reputed
juridical source of the discriminatory treatment,12 the Court concluded:
“il appartient au pouvoir législatif de choisir les mesures appropriées
pour corriger la disposition discriminatoire” (the legislature has the
power to choose the appropriate means to correct the discriminatory
provision).13
The British Columbia Court of Appeal in EGALE found the common
law definition of marriage unconstitutional and reformulated it to mean

9. Halpern v. Can., [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161. Halpern was recently referred to in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), wherein the Court considered the issue
whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the state may deny the protections, benefits,
and obligations conferred by civil marriage to a same-sex couple who wishes to marry. The Court
answered the query in the negative, holding that the Massachusetts Constitution “affirms the dignity
and equality of all individuals,” and “forbids the creation of second-class citizens.” Id. at 948. And
the State has failed “to identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to
same-sex couples.” Id.
10. EGALE Can. Inc. v. Can. (A.G.), [2003] 13 B.C.L.R.2d 1. For case comments
concerning the lower court decision: (2001) B.C.S.C. 1365, see: Jo-Anne Pickel, Judicial Analysis
Frozen in Time: EGALE Can. Inc.. v. Can. (A.G.), 65 SASK. L. REV. 243 (2002); Sarah Loosemore,
EGALE v. Canada: The Case for Same-sex Marriage, 60 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 43 (2002); Julie C.
Lloyd, Defining Marriage, Step One: EGALE v. Can., 39 ALTA L. REV. 963 (2002).
11. Hendricks v. Québec, [2002] R.J.Q. 2506.
12. Id. at ¶ 205; See also id. at ¶ 212 (where the Court also declared of no force and effect
Art. 1.1 of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, and Art. 365 (2) of the Civil Code of
Québec).
13. Id. at ¶ 205.
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“‘the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others.’”14 At
the same time, it suspended the remedy until July 12, 2004, to give the
federal and provincial governments the opportunity to review and revise
legislation in order to bring it in line with the decision. In so doing, the
Court emphasized that such a suspension period would coincide with that
set by the lower court in Halpern v. Canada, which was necessary “to
avoid confusion and uncertainty in the application of the law to same-sex
marriages.”15
When, however, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern
reformulated the definition of marriage as “‘the voluntary union for life
of two persons to the exclusion of others,’”16 and rendered the new
definition effective immediately in Ontario, the British Columbia Court
of Appeal responded by lifting its suspension. At the request of same-sex
marriage advocates, and with the consent of the Attorneys General of
both Canada and British Columbia, the EGALE appeal was reopened on
July 8, 2003. The Court concluded that
any further delay in implementing the remedies will result in an
unequal application of the law as between Ontario and British
Columbia, with same-sex couples being denied the right to marry in
British Columbia until July 12, 2004, while same-sex couples in
Ontario may marry as and when they choose to do so.17

The purpose of this paper is to explore the legal and policy related
reasons behind the same-sex marriage debate. To this end, the paper is
divided into four parts. Part II explores the chronology of events and the
key legal developments that have paved the way for the same-sex
marriage debate. Part III explains why Canadian society is now facing
the same-sex marriage debate. To this end, it explores the legal
institutions of Canadian society and suggests that the institution of
marriage is fundamental to our constitutional structure. The
philosophical foundation of the legal framework, upon which Canadian
federalism is based, is established on the basis of four principles: a
Christian view of man and society, pluralism, the common good, and the
principle of subsidiarity. These principles have been eroded to such a
degree that the very foundation of our system is crumbling, while no
adequate social theory stands ready to take its place.18 Part IV articulates
14. EGALE Can. Inc. v. Can. (A.G.), [2003] 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472; (2003) 13 B.C.L.R. (4th)
1 (B.C.C.A.) at ¶159.
15. Id. at ¶ 161.
16. Halpern v. Can., [2003], 172 O.A.C. 276; (2003) 65 O.R. (3d) 161 (Ont.C.A.) at ¶ 1.
17. EGALE Can. Inc. v. Can. (A.G.), [2003] 228 D.L.R. (4th) 416; 15 B.C.L.R. (4th) 226
(B.C.C.A.) at 419.
18. The thesis is that of Harold J. Berman. It is considered here in the context of Canadian
society. Berman argues that “law and religion are two different aspects, two dimensions of social
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the real issue at stake in the same-sex marriage debate. To this end, the
paper reviews two approaches to same-sex-marriage in Canada, critiques
their philosophical basis, and suggests that the proponents of same-sex
marriage offer no workable philosophy as a foundation for our legal
system. Part V discusses a potential resolution to the debate by
suggesting that the Canadian parliament return to a more objective notion
of the human person and human dignity and recall its primary task to
serve the common good. This Section also presents five main arguments
against redefining marriage: (1) Marriage and same-sex partnerships are
so radically different that to treat them the same would mean distorting
the authentic meaning of human dignity and the very notion of marriage.
Such redefinition would also distort the authentic meaning of equality.;
(2) offend the dignity of children; and (3) overlook scientific evidence
essential to protecting the rights of children; (4) undermine the
importance of the natural family; and (5) disturb the Canadian social
order.
II. THE CHRONOLOGY
A. Introduction
The demand for same-sex marriage is the next logical step in the gay
and lesbian fight for “equality” as defined by the Supreme Court of
Canada. The gay community won their first victory with the
decriminalization of sodomy between consenting adults on the grounds
of privacy. This led to an important chain of Supreme Court decisions
protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination on the grounds of

experience – in all societies, but especially in Western society . . . one cannot flourish without the
other.” He opines that “when the existing legal and religious systems have broken down . . . there
seems to be nothing available to replace them.” For Berman, the answer to the dilemma lies in
society’s ability to overcome the radical separation of law and religion and to move toward a
renewal of “community experiences on all levels, from communes to the United Nations – that
reconcile legal and religious values.” HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND
RELIGION 11, 15-16 (Abingdon Press, 1974) [hereinafter BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND
RELIGION]. See also HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION, 558 (Harvard University Press, 1983) [hereinafter BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION] (“Law is usually associated with the visible side, with works; but a study of the
history of Western law, and especially its origins, reveals its rootedness in the deepest beliefs and
emotions of the people.”); HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW
AND RELIGION 52-53 (Scholars Press, 1993) [hereinafter BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER] (“The crisis
of the Western legal tradition . . . is primarily due . . . to the breakdown of communities on which the
Western legal tradition is founded. . .[namely] stable Christian communities) (“[S]ocial life is
characterized by religious apathy and by fundamental divisions of race, class, sexes, and generations.
Where the bonds of faith are weak, and bonds of kinship and of soil have given way to vague and
abstract nationalism, it is useless to suppose that law can effectuate its ultimate purpose. Unless it is
rooted in community, law becomes merely mechanical and bureaucratic.”).
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sexual orientation. These cases, in turn, set the stage for important lower
court decisions in regard to joint adoptions by gay and lesbian couples,
as well as subsequent changes in provincial and territorial legislation.
Before embarking on a brief summary of important judicial
decisions, it should be noted that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
operates to protect persons from breaches of governmental actors
(federal, provincial, and territorial), or any delegated forms of legislation,
regulations, orders in council, and so forth, as well as government
appointees performing statutory duties.19 Moreover, human rights
legislation has been enacted in the various provinces and territories to
protect persons from breaches of non-governmental actors in the field of
employment, housing, and so forth.
Jurisprudence protecting the rights of gays and lesbians has largely
developed under s. 15 (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, which provides:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

Once an infringement under s. 15 (1) has been established, the onus
shifts to the government to prove that the discrimination is justifiable
under s. 1 of the Charter. In this regard, s. 1 provides: “The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
The Supreme Court of Canada case, R. v. Oakes, sets out the well
established test under s. 1. 20 The Court considers whether or not the
“objective” in limiting rights is of pressing and substantial importance,
and whether or not the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably
justified. The latter consideration involves a proportionality test in which
the Court considers the measure adopted, the means used, and the effects
suffered in relation to the objective in question. More specifically, (a)
there must be a rational connection between the goal and discriminatory
distinction, (b) the right must be impaired no more than is reasonably
necessary to accomplish the goal, and (c) the effect of the discrimination
must be proportionate to the benefit achieved.

19. For further discussion of this point, see PETER W. HOGG, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
CANADA (looseleaf) 34-7 to 34-15 (Thompson, Carswell, 1997) [hereinafter HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. See also Joseph M. Pellicciotti, The Constitutional Guarantee of Equal
Protection in Canada and the United States: Comparative Analysis of the Standards For
Determining the Validity of Governmental Action, 5 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 1 (1997).
20. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, at 138-39.
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The burden of proof under s. 15 is on the claimant alleging the
violation. For their part, however, the courts have not had an easy task
interpreting s. 15 (1).21 Prior to Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia22 the Court applied the Aristotelian principle of equality that
persons who are alike should be treated alike, and persons who are
different should be treated differently. 23In Andrews, the majority
judgement written by Judge McIntyre, rejects the test as deficient in that
it could justify laws that discriminate between various groups, such as
pregnant and non-pregnant women, or persons of dark skin and light
skin. As a result, s. 15 is interpreted as a prohibition of discrimination
defined as a disadvantage caused by the classifications listed in or
analogous categories to it. Any question regarding the justification of the
discrimination is then examined under. s. 1. The new approach,
however, has not been embraced by all members of the Supreme Court
of Canada.
The 1995 decisions of Miron v. Trudel24 and Egan v. Canada, 25
decided the same day, best illustrate the division within the Supreme
Court of Canada over the interpretation of s. 15(1). In both cases, the
Court is divided into the following groups. Lamer C. J., La Forest,
Gonthier and Major JJ., promote an analysis which, at the risk of
oversimplification, essentially requires a distinction based on a personal
characteristic enumerated or analogous to the categories in s. 15(1) that
results in a disadvantage and is irrelevant to the values underlying the
legislation. Sopinka, Cory, McLachlin, and Iacobucci, JJ., on the other
hand, support the Andrews approach that differs from the first in regard
to the question of relevancy. This approach rejects the proposition that
discrimination would not result if a group characteristic were relevant to
21. In regard to the analysis of the law in this section, I am especially indebted to the helpful
discussion of the jurisprudence by HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19 at 52-12 to 52-27;
See also L. Smith and W. Black, The Equality Rights, in THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS, (3rd ed.) at http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/publicat/charter.html; L. Smith, Judicial
Interpretation of Equality Rights Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Some Clear
and Present Dangers, 23 U.B.C. LAW REV. 65 (1988); M. D. Lepofsky, The Canadian Judicial
Approach to Equality Rights: Freedom Ride or Rollercoaster?, 1 N.J.C.L. 315 (1992); C. Sheppard,
Litigating the Relationship Between Equity and Equality, Study Paper For the Ontario Law Reform
Commission (1993); M. Eichler, The Elusive Ideal – Defining Equality, 5 C.H.R.Y.B. 167 (1988);
Pellicciotti, supra note 19; Donna Greschner, Does the Law Advance Equality, 27 QUEEN’S L.J. 299
(2001).
22. Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
23. See Justice McIntyre in Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 166,
(quoting ETHICA NICHOMACEA, Book V3, 1131a-6 (W. Ross, trans., 1925)), when he holds: “The
similarly situated test is a restatement of the Aristotelian principle of formal equality—that ‘things
that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in
proportion to their unalikeness.’”
24. Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
25. Egan v. Can., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
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a legislative aim. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, drawing heavily upon gay
and lesbian literature,26 develops yet a third test that rejects the categorybased perspective27 in favour of a test that focuses on impact. According
to this view, the core element of discrimination is human dignity, that is,
“when members of that group have been made to feel, by virtue of the
impugned legislative distinction, that they are less capable, or less
worthy of recognition or values as human beings or as members of
Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, and
consideration.”28 And discrimination on this basis is judged according to
a subjective-objective standard.29
The analysis of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé on the question of human
dignity is heavily relied upon in the 1999 decision Law v. Canada.30 In
26. See Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, What a Difference a Decade Makes: The Canadian
Constitution and the Family Since 1991, 27 QUEEN’S L.J. 361 (2001) [hereinafter L’Heureux-Dubé,
What a Difference a Decade Makes]; Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Making Equality Work in Family
Law, 14 CAN. J. FAM. L. 103 (1997) [hereinafter L’Heureux-Dubé, Making Equality Work]; Douglas
Kropp, “Categorical Failure”: Canada’s Equality Jurisprudence – Changing Notions of Identity
and the Legal Subject, 23 QUEEN’S L.J. 201 (1997); Mimi Liu, A “Prophet With Honour”: An
Examination of the Gender Equality Jurisprudence of Madam Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé of the
Supreme Court of Canada, 25 QUEEN’S L.J. 417 (2000).
27. Egan, at ¶ 53 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J.) (rejecting this approach because it is “distanced and
desensitized from real people’s real experiences.”)
28. Id., at ¶ 39 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J.) (emphasis added). On the notion of human dignity, the
following comments are particularly noteworthy: “First, I acknowledge that the above definition
essentially tries to put into words the notion of fundamental human dignity. Dignity being a
notoriously elusive concept, however, it is clear that this definition cannot, by itself, bear the weight
of s. 15’s task on its shoulders. It needs precision and elaboration. I shall attempt to demonstrate
shortly how this approach to discrimination can find more concrete and principled expression using
many of the criteria that have in the past proven themselves to be highly apposite under the approach
taken by this Court in Andrews. As such, it will become evident that the approach I suggest is far
less a departure from that developed in Andrews than may appear at first blush. I believe many of
those analytical tools to be valid. The problem, in my mind, lies not with the tools but with the
framework within which they have in the past been employed. In short, if the framework is not
perfectly suited for the tools, then we do not use the tools to their full potential. Second, I note that
although the utopian ideal would be a society in which nobody is made to feel debased, devalued or
denigrated as a result of legislative distinctions, such an ideal is clearly unrealistic. The guarantee
against discrimination cannot possibly hold the state to a standard of conduct consistent with its most
sensitive citizens. Clearly, a measure of objectivity must be incorporated into this determination.
This being said, however, it would be ironic and, in large measure, self-defeating to the purposes of
s. 15 to assess the absence or presence of discriminatory impact according to the standard of the
“reasonable, secular, able-bodied, white male”. A more appropriate standard is subjectiveobjective—the reasonably held view of one who is possessed of similar characteristics, under similar
circumstances, and who is dispassionate and fully apprised of the circumstances. The important
principle, however, which this Court has accepted, is that discriminatory effects must be evaluated
from the point of view of the victim, rather than from the point of view of the state.” Id. at ¶¶ 40, 41.
29. Id. at ¶ 41 ( L’Heureux-Dubé, J.).
30. Law v. Can., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 497, ¶ 49. The Court makes passing references to other
judicial statements about the importance of human dignity as a consideration and then adopts the
definition of human dignity set out by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, namely her reference to persons
who “have been made to feel . . . less capable, or less worthy of recognition or values as human
beings.” Id.
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this case, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously holds that in order
to prove discrimination the distinction must be based on listed or
analogous grounds and constitute “a violation of essential human
dignity”31which is held to mean when “an individual or group feels selfrespect and self-worth.” 32 In brief, the approach of Justice L’HeureuxDubé is partly accepted, namely her notion pertaining to human dignity.
However, the categorical approach, which she despises, remains intact.
With this brief review let us turn to the summary of events leading to
where the same-sex marriage debate stands today in Canadian society.
B. Decriminalization of Sodomy
On December 22, 1967, then Justice Minister Pierre Trudeau,
proposed extensive amendments to the Criminal Code, largely
decriminalizing sodomy.33 In his view, the amendments “knocked down
a lot of totems and overrode a lot of taboos” towards “bringing the laws
of the land up to contemporary society.”34 This particular revision of the
Federal Criminal Code, applied across the nation, was justified on the
grounds that the State had no business in “the bedrooms of the nations”
and “what’s done in private between adults.”35 The issue of sodomy was
said to be relevant only when it became public or related to minors.36

31. Id. at ¶ 88.
32. Id. at ¶ 53. The Court went on to note:
Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or
circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is
enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of different
individuals, taking into account the context underlying their differences. Human dignity
is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is
enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and groups within
Canadian society. Human dignity within the meaning of the equality guarantee does not
relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se, but rather concerns the
manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law. Does
the law treat him or her unfairly, taking into account all of the circumstances regarding
the individuals affected and excluded by the law?
Id.
33. See also Klippert v. The Queen [1968] 2 C.C.C. 129 (analysis of the law prior to the
amendment); R v. Butler [1993] Man. R.2d 952; Halm v. Can. [1996] I.F.C. 547; The Queen v.
Carmen [1995] O.A.C. 214 (analysis of the provisions of the Criminal Code with respect to minors)
(I.F.C not found in recognized Canadian reporters, Appendix C, Canadian Guide).
34. Owen Wood, The Fight for Gay Rights, CBC Online, at http://www.cbc.ca/news/indepth/
background/gayrights2.html (Jan. 2001). See, e.g., Trudeau’s Omnibus Bill: Challenging Canadian
Taboos, CBC Archives, at http://www.archives.cbc.ca/300c.asp?id=1-73-538.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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C. Sexual Orientation and Protected Category Status
On December 16, 1977, sexual orientation was included as a
prohibited ground of discrimination in the Quebec Human Rights Code,
and over the years, other jurisdictions have followed suit.37
At the federal level, from 1979 to 1996, there were numerous
legislative attempts under the Canadian Human Rights Code to prohibit
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.38 The Ontario Court
of Appeal nudged the process along in the 1992 decision Haig v. Canada
by ruling that the absence of sexual orientation from the list of proscribed
grounds of discrimination in s. 3 of the Canadian Human Rights Act was
unconstitutional and in violation of the equality provision section 15
(1).39
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Egan held that
sexual orientation was a personal characteristic analogous to other
enumerated grounds in s. 15 (1) of the Charter. Just three years later, in
1998, provincial and territorial opposition to including sexual orientation
as a protected category came to an end. In Vriend v. Alberta, the
Supreme Court of Canada overturned the Alberta Court of Appeal,40 in

37. Id.
38. Id. See for example the discussion by Wood and Thompson concerning reports of the
Canadian Human Rights Commission, and Parliamentary Committee on Equality, which
recommended that sexual orientation be included in the Canadian Human Rights Act. In addition,
see the reference to gay activist, MP Svend Robinson’s who attempted to pass Bills from 1983 to
1991 designed to protect sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination.
39. Haig v. Can., [1992] 94 D.L.R. (4th) 1. In this case, a five year member of the Canadian
Armed Forces, after informing his commanding officer that he was homosexual, ceased “to be
eligible for promotions, postings or further military career training” in accordance with Canadian
Armed Forces Policy. The Court noted that he felt “humiliated and stigmatized,” could “no longer
bring himself to work under these conditions,” and would have filed a complaint against the Armed
Forces before the Canadian Human Rights Commission had sexual orientation been a protected
ground of discrimination. On the basis of affidavit evidence, the Court concluded that “gays and
lesbians perceive that they are objects of invidious discrimination” in society. Indeed, they are
“socially disadvantaged” and constitute a “historically disadvantaged group” and a “‘discrete and
insular minority’ group.” In choosing to read sexual orientation into the Act, the Court concluded
that “it is surely safe to assume that Parliament would favour extending the benefit of s. 3(1) of the
Act to homosexual persons over nullifying the entire legislative scheme,” especially since
“enlightened human rights legislative policy has evolved in this country. It is now an integral part of
our social fabric.” Id. at 4, 14 (citations omitted).
40. Vriend v. Alta. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, rev’g, [1996] 34 C.R.R. (2d) 243. Justice McClung
sitting on the Alberta Court of Appeal, duly noted that the Alberta legislature had continuously voted
against including sexual orientation as a protected category. He gives a scathing lecture on the
proper role of courts within a constitutional system founded on democratic governance. Justice
O’Leary concurred with Justice McClung., in part, finding that silence may constitute governmental
action and thereby engage Charter scrutiny under s. 15 (1). But the respective Act made no
distinctions between heterosexuals and homosexuals which existed independently from the Act. The
Supreme Court of Canada essentially adopted the dissenting opinion, wherein Justice Hunt found a
breach of s. 15 (1) because, by failing to include sexual orientation, the Alberta legislature had
encouraged and supported the distinction that exists between homosexuals and heterosexuals, thus
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holding that the Individual’s Rights Protection Act (IRPA), which
omitted reference to sexual orientation as a protected category, was in
violation of s. 15 (1) and not saved by s. 1.41 In particular, the Court
found that legislative omissions could engage Charter scrutiny, and two
distinctions had been made under the Act on the basis of sexual
orientation, namely, homosexuals versus other groups and homosexuals
versus heterosexuals. According to the Court, both of these distinctions
resulted in the denial of access to remedial procedures under the Act in
question and consequently sent a message to all Albertans that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was acceptable which
thereby contributed to the ongoing discrimination and psychological
harm suffered by gays and lesbians.42
On September 17, 2003, the House of Commons passed Bill C-250,
An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, which expanded the prohibition
against hate propaganda to include any section of the public
distinguished by sexual orientation.43 To appreciate how this amendment
may be applied in Canada, the 2002 decision of Owens v. Saskatchewan
(Human Rights Commission) is revealing.44 In that case, three gay males
complained about an advertisement Owens placed in the newspaper,
which quoted scripture that condemned homosexuality.
Owens

reinforcing hostile and stereotypical attitudes against homosexuals who had suffered historical
disadvantage, all of which could not be saved by s. 1.
41. Id. In this case, a teacher had been fired from his job at a college which held firm
religious beliefs against homosexuality and homosexual practices. He was terminated when he
refused to resign after admitting his gay lifestyle to the college president. He then filed a complaint
with the Alberta Human Rights Commission, the monitoring body under the Individual’s Rights
Protection Act (IRPA), on the grounds that his employer discriminated against him. But the
Commission refused to investigate because sexual orientation was not a protected ground of
discrimination under the Act. He later filed a motion in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench for
declaratory relief, which was granted on the basis that the omission to protect persons from
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was a violation of s. 15 (1) of the Charter and not
justified under s. 1. In a two-to-one decision, the Alberta Court of Appeal found no breach and
reversed the decision. Justice McClung, in the majority decision, held that an omission of sexual
orientation did not amount to governmental action for the purposes of the Charter. The silence was
said to leave heterosexuals and homosexuals the possibility of privately contracting with each other
without pain of sanctions under the IRPA.
42. It is noteworthy that in his majority decision, Judge Cory remarked that the Supreme
Court of Canada had not adopted a uniform approach to s. 15 (1), but found that any differences in
perspective did not affect the result in the case. (This analysis does not accord with the views of
constitutional experts like Hogg who finds significant differences in the various approaches. See,
e.g,. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 52-17 to 52-27). Under the s. 1 analysis, Judge
Cory held, among other things, that the exclusion of sexual orientation from the Act was antithetical
to its very purpose. Judge Major, dissenting in part, disagreed with the remedy and held that the
declaration of invalidity should be suspended for a year to allow for the Alberta legislature to amend
the under inclusiveness problem or to invoke s. 33 of the Charter, which permits a legislature to
override the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision.
43. Bill C-250, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, 2d Sess., 37th Parl., 2002-2003, 51-52.
44. Owens v. Sask. (Human Rights Comm’n), [2002] S.J.No 732; 2002 S.K.Q.B. 506.
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unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Queen’s Bench from a decision
of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Court that found him in violation of
the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code because he exposed the
complainants to hatred and ridicule.
D. Same-Sex Couples and Joint Adoptions
The gay community made great progress when courts at the lower
levels (i.e., in Ontario,45 Alberta,46 and Nova Scotia47) initiated changes
in provincial legislation to allow same-sex couples to jointly apply for
adoption. Other jurisdictions, such as Saskatchewan,48 voluntarily
amended its legislation in response to the Supreme Court of Canada
decision in M v. H (discussed in more detail below).49
In regard to same-sex unions and adoption, the Ontario provincial
court decision K and B (Re)50 is especially noteworthy because it made
important factual findings about same-sex relationships and parenting,
and has been referred to, considered, and applied in various
jurisdictions.51 In that case, the Court found that the definition of spouse
under the Act operated to deny lesbian couples’ protected equality rights
under s. 15 (1) of the Charter and could not be saved by s. 1.52 In
particular, the applicants were denied the benefit of applying to adopt a
child on the basis of sexual orientation, which was not found to be in

45. See K and B (Re), [1995] 125 D.L.R. (4th) 653; 15 R.F.L. (4th)129 (Ont. Prov. Ct); Child
and Family Services Act, R.S.C., ch. 11, § 146 (4) (1990) (Can.), available at
http://192.75.156.68/DBLaws/Statutes/English/90c11_e.htm#P2853_251362.
46. See C and M, (Re), [1999] 253 A.R. 74 (Alta.Q.B.); The Miscellaneous Statutes
Amendment Act, R.S.A., ch. 26, §§ 4, 25 (1999); Child Welfare Act R.S.A.C-12 (2000) (as
amended).
47. See S.C.M. (Re), [2001] 194 N.S.R. (2d) 362 (N.S.S.C.); Children and Family Services
Act. R.S.C., ch. 5, § 72, (1990) (Can.), available at http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/legc/.
48. Adoption Act, S.S., ch. A-5.2, §§ 16, 23 (1998) (Can.) available at
http://www.qp.gov.sk.ca/publications/index.cfm?fuseaction=details&c=302815&id=2.
49. See also Jennifer A. Cooper, Opinion on Common Law Relationships, 1 REVIEW PANEL
ON COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIPS (2001) (helpful discussion of adoption laws in various Canadian
jurisdictions), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/reviewpanel/vol1/index.html (helpful
discussion of adoption laws in various Canadian jurisdictions).
50. [1995] 125 D.L.R. (4th) 653; 15 R.F.L. (4th)129 (Ont. Prov. Ct.).
51. Most notably, it has been referred to in the Ontario Appellate decision of M v. H, [1996]
31 O.R. (3d) 417, and the lower court decision, Halpern v. Toronto Clerk, [2000] 51 O.R. (3d) 742.
52. K and B (Re), [1995] 125 D.L.R. (4th) at 653; 15 R.F.L. (4th) at 129. In that case, four
lesbian couples filed joint applications for adoption and challenged the constitutional validity of the
definition of “spouse” under the Ontario Child and Family Services Act. All of the children had been
conceived through artificial insemination during the existing relationships, that is, one of the partners
was the birth mother of the children or child in question in each adoption application (three lesbian
couples sought to apply for adoption of two children while the fourth couple sought to adopt one
child).
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violation of the best interests of the child.53 Indeed, the Court held that
the same-sex relationships, including parenting, were virtually identical
to those of the opposite sex54 in finding that each of the lesbian couples
had been “living together in committed relationships for varying lengths
of time,”55 which “might be termed ‘conjugal,’ in that they ha[d] all the
characteristics of a relationship formalized by marriage.”56 Further, the
Court held that “[h]omosexual individuals do not exhibit higher levels of
psychopathology than do heterosexual individuals” in that “there is no
good evidence to suggest that homosexual individuals are less healthy
psychologically and therefore less able to be emotionally available to
their children.”57
E. Same-Sex Couples and Benefits
A number of constitutional challenges based on claims for benefits
changed the landscape of family law in Canada. Two key Supreme Court
of Canada decisions were decided in 1995 and 1999, namely, Egan and
M v. H., respectively. The latter decision provoked amendments to 68

53. Under the s. 1 analysis, the Court held there was no rational connection between
prohibiting a same-sex couple from applying to adopt and the objective of the Act, namely the best
interests of the child; the Court found that the effects of the provision prohibiting same-sex couples
from applying to adopt were disproportionate to the objective of the Act since there was no evidence
that “adoption of children by homosexual partners could never be in the child’s best interest.” Id. at
¶¶ 160, 167.
54. Concerning the ability of homosexuals to parent children, the Court gave “great weight”
to the affidavit evidence of three experts (a sociology professor, psychologist, and psychiatrist), and
then made several important findings. It held that “there is no reason to believe the sexual orientation
of the parents will be an indicator of the sexual orientation of the children in their care,” and that
there is no “evidence that the homosexual orientation of the parents, especially lesbian mothers, will
produce any significantly greater incidence of psychiatric disturbance, or emotional or behavioural
problems, or intellectual impairment than is seen in the population of children raised by heterosexual
parents.” Id. at ¶ 68. Other important fact findings included: (1) “the traditional family . . . is now a
minority”; (2) “there is no reason to conclude that alteration of the family structure itself is
detrimental to child development”; (3) “the most important element in the healthy development of a
child is a stable, consistent, warm, and responsive relationship between a child and his or her caregiver”; (4) “[d]espite stereotypical beliefs to the contrary, there is no evidence to support the
suggestion that most gay men and lesbians have unstable or dysfunctional relationships”; (5) there is
“no indication that the possible stigma or harassment to which children of gay or lesbian parents may
be exposed is necessarily worse than other possible forms of . . . stigma”; and, (6) “same-sex couples
should be treated in the same manner as are opposite-sex common law couples with regard to the
issue of adoption.” Id. at ¶¶ 50-75.
55. Id. at ¶ 24.
56. Id. Each of the couples have cohabited together continuously and exclusively for lengthy
periods, ranging from six to thirteen years; their financial affairs are interconnected; they share
household expenses, have joint bank accounts and in some cases, they own property together in joint
tenancy; they share the housekeeping burdens to the extent that they are able in light of their
respective careers and employments; the individual partners share a committed sexual relationship.
Most importantly, they all share equally the joys and burdens of child rearing.
57. Id. at ¶ 60.
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federal statutes so that same-sex couples would be assured the same
benefits as heterosexual couples.
1. Egan v. Canada
In Egan, a homosexual couple in their sixties challenged the
definition of “spouse” under Old Age Security Act when an application
for benefits was rejected because the definition restricted the receipt of
allowance to spouses in a heterosexual union, whether the couple was
legally married or living common law.
In a badly split decision, five members of the Supreme Court of
Canada found the definition of “spouse” to be constitutional and
dismissed the appeal.58 However, the gay community won a huge victory
on account of one crucial finding. The Court unanimously held that
sexual orientation was an analogous ground to those enumerated under s.
15 (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (i.e., sex,
religion, and so forth). In particular, Justice La Forest, who later went on
to give strong statements in favor of the natural family, made the
following fatal concession:
I have no difficulty accepting the appellants’ contention that whether or
not sexual orientation is based on biological or physiological factors,
which may be a matter of some controversy, it is a deeply personal
characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at
unacceptable personal costs, and so falls within the ambit of s. 15
protection as being analogous to the enumerated grounds.59

Due to this finding, and the plurality of judicial opinions, the effect
of important findings supporting the natural family were watered down.
Indeed, La Forest noted that many couples who live together (i.e.,
brothers and sisters, friends) were excluded from receiving benefits,
whatever their sexual orientation. He emphasized that the distinction
between married and common law couples, on the one hand, and all
other couples, on the other hand, was one “deeply rooted in our
fundamental values and traditions.”60 Further, he noted that “its ultimate
58. Egan v. Can., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. Justice La Forest, giving the judgment for Chief
Justice Lamer, and Justices Gonthier and Major, found no discrimination within the meaning of s. 15
in that Parliament had the right to support married and unmarried heterosexual couples to the
exclusion of other types of relationships. In the swing judgment, Sopinka J. disagreed, finding the
definition to be discriminatory but justifiable as a reasonable limit within the meaning of s. 1. In
dissent, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé gave the judgment for Justices Cory, McLachlin, and Iacobucci,
holding that the provision infringed s. 15 and could not be saved by s. 1.
59. Id. at ¶ 5. See also the comments by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé when she noted that the
distinction in question is based on sexual orientation, and described as “an aspect of ‘personhood’
that is quite possibly biologically based and that is at the very least a fundamental choice.” Id. at ¶
89.
60. Id. at ¶ 20.
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raison d’être . . . is firmly anchored in the biological and social realities
that heterosexual couples have the unique ability to procreate, that
children are the product of these relationships, and that they are generally
care for and nurtures by those who live in that relationship.”61
As previously discussed, L’Heureux-Dubé, in her dissenting opinion,
took a very different approach to s. 15 (1) emphasizing a discriminatory
effects based test, which eventually lead to important findings favoring
same-sex marriages. In particular, she found that the homosexual couple
had been marginalized as poor, elderly, and homosexual.62 Moreover,
they had been “directly and completely excluded, as a couple, from any
entitlement to a basic shared standard of living for elderly persons
cohabiting in a relationship analogous to marriage. This interest is an
important facet of full and equal membership in Canadian society.” 63
In her consideration of s. 1, L’Heureux-Dubé reached two important
conclusions for the same-sex marriage debate. First, in that case, she
framed the issue as one of interdependence and found that any assertion
that same-sex couples “were somehow less interdependent than oppositesex relationships is, itself, a fruit of stereotype rather than one of
demonstrable, empirical reality.”64 Second, she rejected the argument
that “homosexual relationships have a distinct biological reality – namely
that homosexuality is non-procreative,” finding instead, this proposition
“dangerously reminiscent of the type of biologically based arguments”
that had been proffered to support unjust distinctions between pregnant

61. Id. at ¶ 21. The following are the comments of Justice La Forest in full:
[M]arriage has from time immemorial been firmly grounded in our legal tradition, one
that is itself a reflection of long-standing philosophical and religious traditions. But its
ultimate raison d’être transcends all of these and is firmly anchored in the biological and
social realities that heterosexual couples have the unique ability to procreate, that most
children are the product of these relationships, and that they are generally cared for and
nurtured by those who live in that relationship. In this sense, marriage is by nature
heterosexual. It would be possible to legally define marriage to include homosexual
couples, but this would not change the biological and social realities that underlie the
traditional marriage. Id.
He also speaks to the distinction between married and non-married heterosexual couples, wherein he
states:
But many of the underlying concerns that justify Parliament’s support and protection of
legal marriage extend to heterosexual couples who are not legally married. Many of these
couples live together indefinitely, bring forth children and care for them in response to
familial instincts rooted in the human psyche. These couples have need for support just as
legally married couples do in performing this critical task, which is of benefit to all
society. Language has long captured the essence of this relationship by the expression
“common law marriage.”
Id. at ¶ 23.
62. Id. at ¶ 89.
63. Id. at ¶ 90 (emphasis original).
64. Id. at ¶ 94.
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and non-pregnant women, distinctions that had been rejected by the
Supreme Court of Canada.65
2. M. v. H
In the 1998 case M v. H,66 a lesbian couple had lived together for
about nine years in H’s home. During the relationship, they started their
own business, and purchased property together. When the relationship
ended, M sought an order for partition and sale of the house and other
relief under the Family Law Act.
The main issue was whether the term “spouse” in s. 29 of Ontario’s
Family Law Act discriminated against same-sex partners by denying
them the possibility of seeking relief under the Act, and whether it could
be saved by s. 1.67 The Court found that the Act failed to accord
cohabiting same-sex couples the same benefits as cohabiting oppositesex couples on the basis of sexual orientation, an analogous ground of
enumeration. This, in turn, exacerbated the preexisting disadvantage,
vulnerability, stereotyping, and prejudice of gays and lesbians by failing
to provide access to a system or set of procedures that could confer
economic benefit and protect the economic interests and financial need
of individuals in intimate relationships. 68
According to the Court, the appeal had “nothing to do with marriage
per se.”69 Indeed, “the rights and obligations that exist between married

65. Id. at ¶ 95 (comparing Bliss v. Can., (A.G.) [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 at ¶ 190, with Brooks v.
Can. Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 at ¶ 1243-44).
66. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. It is noteworthy that the couple eventually settled their property
dispute before the appeal went to the Supreme Court of Canada, which rejected the argument that the
issue was moot on the grounds that only the Ontario Attorney General had sought and was granted
leave to appeal.
67. Id. at ¶ 68. Section 29 of the Ontario Family Law Act had expanded the traditional
meaning of spouse (married man and woman) to include a broader range of couples (unmarried man
and woman) seeking assistance relating to mutual support obligations. In this regard, “spouse”
meant unmarried couples who had “cohabited continuously for a period of not leass than three years
or in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a child.” In
turn, cohabitation was defined as living together “in a conjugal relationship, whether within or
without marriage.” The Court eventually interpreted “conjugal” to include “shared shelter, sexual
and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and children, as well as societal
perception of the couple,” and found that gays and lesbians were capable of being involved in
conjugal relataionships.
68. Id. at ¶93. Under the s. 1 analysis, the Court rejected arguments that the overall purpose
of the Act, and the support obligations in particular, were meant to encourage and support the
family, to remedy disadvantages suffered by women in opposite-sex relationships, and to protect
children. Rather, the Court defined the purpose more broadly, ultimately concluding that there was
no rational connection between “‘the equitable resolution of economic disputes that arise when
intimate relationships between financially interdependent individuals break down,’ and ‘to alleviate
the burden on the public purse. . .’” Id. (citation omitted).
69. Id. at ¶ 52.
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persons play[ed] no part in the analysis” since the Act did not extend
them to unmarried couples in all circumstances.”70
3. Modernization of benefits and obligations act
In the year following the M v. H decision, the House of Commons
passed a motion that upheld the monogamous and heterosexual notion of
marriage and maintained that Parliament would do what was required to
preserve this definition.71
The M v. H decision eventually led to significant changes in federal
legislation. Parliament, however, made serious efforts to stop any future
claims for same-sex marriage. In particular, the traditional definition of
marriage was reaffirmed in the Modernization of Benefits and
Obligations Act which extended federal benefits and obligations to all
unmarried couples who have cohabited in a conjugal relationship for at
least one year, regardless of their sexual orientation.72 The Act amended
sixty-eight federal statutes (i.e., Income Tax Act, Canada Pension Plan,
Old Age Security Act, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and Criminal
Code). Yet, Clause 1.1 preserved the traditional definition of marriage:
“For greater certainty, the amendments made by this Act do not affect
the meaning of the word ‘marriage,’ that is, the lawful union of one man
and one woman to the exclusion of all others.”
As was argued by the Attorney General of Canada in the Halpern
appeal, the legislative history of the Act reveals that the inclusion of
Clause 1.1 was a result of heated debates in the House of Commons and
the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights and
the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs; the
concern among many committee witnesses, senators, and members of
parliament was that “the legislation would erode the distinctiveness of
marriage or alter its definition by equating common-law same-sex
relationships and common-law opposite-sex relationships with oppositesex marriages.”73 During the process, Hon. Anne McLellan, Minister of
Justice, then Attorney General of Canada, assured Canadians on two
separate occasions that the legal definition of marriage and the societal
70. Id. at ¶ 53. And on another occasion the Court stated that the appeal did not “consider
whether same-sex couples can marry, or whether same-sex couples must, for all purposes, be treated
in the same manner as unmarried opposite-sex couples.” Id. at ¶ 55.
71. Halpern v. Can. (A.G), Factum of the Appellant, The Attorney General of Canada, and
the Attorney General of Ontario, Docket Number: C39172 and C39174, Toronto, 10 January 2003,
at ¶ 44.
72. Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, R.S.C., ch.12 (2000) (Can.).
73. Halpern v. Can., Factum of the Appellant, The Attorney General of Canada, and the
Attorney General of Ontario, Docket Number: C39172 and C39174, Toronto, 10 January 2003, at ¶
41.
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consensus about its nature would be preserved, once before the
Committee on Justice and Human Rights74 and another time before the
Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs.75
Just three years later, on June 17, 2003, the government’s position
changed dramatically when, immediately following the release of the
Appellate level decision in Halpern, Prime Minister Jean Chretien
announced that a new law would be drafted allowing for same-sex
marriage.
4. Same-sex couples and marriage: Halpern as a case study
In the Halpern case, the last case in a trilogy of cases concerning
same-sex marriage, seven gay and lesbian couples applied for civil
marriage licenses from the Clerk of the City of Toronto who, having put
these applications in abeyance, applied to the court for direction. The
Clerk’s application was eventually stayed when the couples commenced
their own application. Meanwhile, two of the couples decided to marry in
a religious ceremony at the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto
(MCCT), a Christian Church which registered the marriages, issued
marriage certificates, and then submitted the documentation to the Office
of the Registrar General who refused to accept the documents on the
grounds that same-sex marriages were prohibited by law. MCCT
launched an application that was eventually consolidated with that of the
seven couples.76
In finding that the prohibition against same-sex marriage contravenes
s. 15 (1) of the Charter of Rights, the Halpern Court put respect for the

74. Id. (quoting Minister McLellan: “Bill C-23 will modernize federal legislation to extend
benefits and obligations to common-law same-sex couples in the same way as to common law
opposite-sex couples. What is equally important is that Bill C-23 does so while preserving the
existing legal definition and societal consensus that marriage is the union of one man and one
woman, to the exclusion of all others, as defined by the courts. Let me briefly elaborate on this point.
The definition of marriage, which has been consistently applied by the courts and governments in
Canada and was reaffirmed last year through a resolution of this House, dates back to 1866. Let me
be clear: this definition will not change. This bill is not about marriage. In fact, the approach chosen
in this bill deliberately maintains the clear legal distinction between marriage and unmarried
common-law relationships.”).
75. Id. at ¶ 43 (quoting Minister McLellan: “First, since the day Bill C-23 was introduced in
the House of Commons I have repeatedly said that this bill is about fairness and tolerance. It is not
about marriage and will not, in any way, alter or affect the legal meaning of marriage. However, it
did become clear during consideration of the bill in the House of Commons that it was necessary for
the government to reassure some Canadians by stating this fact in the bill itself. Clause 1.1 was
added to clearly indicate that the legal meaning of marriage as the lawful union of one man and one
woman to the exclusion of all others would not be changed by this bill.”).
76. Several parties were granted intervener status: The Interfaith Coalition on Marriage and
Family, The Association for Marriage and the Family in Ontario, the Canadian Coalition for Liberal
Rabbis for Same-sex Marriage and the Canadian Human Rights Commission.
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dignity of the human person at the core of equality.77 In its analysis of s.
15 (1), the Court, relying on Justice Iacobucci in Law v. Canada, argued
that a violation would occur when the impugned legislation conflicts
with the purpose of s. 15 (1) “‘to prevent the violation of essential human
dignity and freedom’” and “‘to promote a society in which all persons
enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of
Canadian society.’”78 The Court then set out a three-part test:
(1) whether the impugned law: (a) draws a formal distinction on the
basis of one or more personal characteristics; or (b) fails to take into
account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position resulting in
substantively differential treatment on the basis of one or more personal
characteristics;
(2) whether the differential treatment is based on one or more
enumerated and analogous grounds; and
(3) whether the differential treatment discriminates by imposing a
burden upon or withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner
which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or
personal characteristics which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating
or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of
recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian
society, equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.79

In regard to part (1), the Court found that the common law definition
of marriage created a formal distinction between same-sex and oppositesex couples on the basis of sexual orientation. The Attorney General
argued that the basis of differential treatment was legislation granting
governmental rights and obligations associated with marriage, rather than
the institution of marriage itself. Further, since the Modernization of
Benefits and Obligations Act had ensured that same-sex couples receive
equal rights and duties in federal law, the source of this differential
treatment had consequently been abolished.80 The Attorney General also
appealed to objective claims about marriage, arguing that marriage is not
a common law notion, but rather, a basic institution of society which
predates the State and is entitled to its protection and support. Lastly, by
its very nature, the institution of marriage is “a unique opposite sex
77. Halpern v. Can., [2003] 65 O.R. (3d) 161. The Canadian same-sex marriage trilogy raised
numerous constitution-based arguments concerning federalism and the Charter. For the purposes of
Part II of this paper, only the s. 15 (1) Charter issue will be raised. Issues relating to federalism will
be explored in Part III.
78. Id. at ¶ 60 (quoting Law v. Can. (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1
S.C.R. 497, ¶ 88).
79. Id. at ¶ 61.
80. Id. at ¶ 66.
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bond,” a key feature found “across different times, cultures and religions
as a virtually universal norm.”81
The Court was not persuaded; it held that the Attorney General’s
analysis required the existence of a distinction, the source of which was
irrelevant. It did not matter whether the common law definition had
“adopted, rather than invented, the opposite sex feature of marriage.”82
Further, once the federal and provincial governments chose to give legal
recognition to marriage and support it with a “myriad of rights and
obligations,”83 the State was “‘obliged to do so in a non-discriminatory
manner.’”84 In regard to the very nature or essence of marriage, the Court
rejected any appeal to universal claims, holding that such reasoning was
“circular” since one could argue that “marriage is heterosexual because it
‘just is.’”85
In dealing with the second part of the s. 15 (1) test, the Court, relying
on the Supreme Court of Canada decision Egan, found that sexual
orientation is a “‘deeply personal characteristic that is either
unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs.’”86
With respect to the third part of the test, the Court appealed directly
to the notion of human dignity and defined it in a purely subjective
manner as whether or not “‘an individual or group feels self-respect and
self-worth.’”87 The Court then purported to apply a subjective-objective
test whereby it considered “the individual’s or group’s traits, history, and
circumstances in order to evaluate whether a reasonable person, in
circumstances similar to the claimant, would find that the impugned law
differentiates in a manner that demeans his or her dignity.”88
To determine whether the impugned law demeaned one’s dignity, the
Court identified four contextual factors which focus on the impact of
discrimination – again, a largely subjective consideration. The four
factors are: (1) pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, or vulnerability
of the claimants; (2) correspondence between the grounds and the
claimant’s actual needs, capacities, and circumstances; (3) ameliorative
purpose or effects on more disadvantaged individuals or groups in
society; and (4) the nature of the interest affected.
After considering these factors, the Court concluded that homosexual
persons had suffered from an historic disadvantage, consisting in violent
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at ¶ 66.
Id. at ¶¶ 68, 70.
Id. at ¶ 69.
Id. at ¶ 69.
Id. at ¶ 71.
Id. at ¶ 74.
Id. at ¶ 78.
Id. at ¶ 79.
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crimes, public harassment, verbal abuse, discrimination and
stigmatization and cited the Supreme Court decisions of Egan and Vriend
as authority.89 It then went on to give a functional definition of marriage,
stating that any law that prohibited same-sex couples from marrying
ignored the needs, capacities, and circumstances of these couples since
“same-sex couples are capable of forming ‘long, lasting, loving and
intimate relationships.’”90 Moreover, the Court noted that an increasing
amount of same-sex couples were raising children either biologically
conceived or acquired by means of adoption, surrogacy arrangements, or
artificial reproduction technology.91 Further, the Court held that samesex couples who had been excluded from the scope of the ameliorative
law had “experienced historical discrimination and disadvantages.”92 The
Court minimized the fact that opposite-sex couples experienced
economic disadvantage in comparison to same-sex couples since they
bear the burden of raising the majority of society’s children. It held that
this was but one factor since “[p]ersons do not marry solely for the
purposes of raising children.”93 Finally, the Court found that the
exclusion of same-sex couples “from a fundamental societal
institution . . . perpetuates the view that same-sex relationships are less
worthy of recognition than opposite-sex relationships. In so doing, it
offends the dignity of persons in same-sex relationships.”94
In brief, the Court found that the very dignity of the human person in
same-sex relationships had been violated by their exclusion from the
institution of marriage in violation of s. 15 (1).
The Court then moved on to consider whether the breach of equality
rights could be justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit in
a free and democratic society.
The Halpern Court applied the test in R v. Oakes95 for determining
whether the law was a reasonable limit. In sum, the objective of the law
must be “pressing and substantial” and the means chosen must be
“reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and a democratic
society.” This means that the rights violation must be “rationally
connected to the objective of the law,” that the impugned law must
“minimally impair the Charter guarantee,” and that proportionality exists
“between effect of the law and its objective.”

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at ¶ 83.
Id. at ¶ 94.
Id. at ¶ 93.
Id. at ¶ 98.
Id. at ¶ 99.
Id. at ¶ 107.
Id. at ¶ 113-14 (citing R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-39).
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The Court articulated the purpose of the common law definition of
marriage to be: “i) uniting the opposite sexes; ii) encouraging the birth
and raising of children of the marriage; and iii) companionship.”96 The
first purpose was found to demean same-sex couples since it favored one
type of relationship over another.97 The second objective was regarded as
pressing and substantial but not constituting a valid reason for limiting
marriage to heterosexuals since lifting the ban against same-sex marriage
would not hinder this objective for heterosexual couples. Moreover, it
would facilitate the raising of children in same-sex homes.98 The third
goal was considered laudable but could not justify excluding same-sex
couples from marriage especially because “[e]ncouraging companionship
between persons of the opposite sex perpetuates the view that persons in
same-sex relationships are not equally capable of providing
companionship and forming lasting and loving relationships.”99
The Court then concluded that the rights violation, namely
maintaining marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution, was not
rationally connected to the objectives of marriage; further, the means
chosen by Parliament to achieve its objectives did not impair the rights of
same-sex couples as minimally as possible since same-sex couples had
been “completely excluded from a fundamental societal institution,” the
societal significance of which could not be calculated in merely
economic terms. 100
5. Summary and implications
As we have seen, the decriminalization of sodomy led to changes in
some provincial and territorial human rights legislation whereby sexual
orientation became a protected category. However, proposed changes at
the federal and some local levels continued to meet stiff resistance. This
was countered by the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Egan which
made sexual orientation a protected category in the Charter of Rights of
Freedoms.
The pivotal finding in Egan that sexual orientation is a “deeply
personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or changeable only at
unacceptable personal costs” effectively marginalized all those who have
not embraced the gay social agenda and, in particular, those who have
been seeking treatment. In effect, it put an end to any free and open
discussion of empirical data challenging such a proposition.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at ¶ 118.
Id. at ¶ 119.
Id. at ¶ 120-23.
Id. at ¶ 124.
Id. at ¶ 136-39.
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The same year Egan was decided, the Ontario Provincial Court in Re
K and B released its influential decision allowing same-sex couples to
bring joint applications for adoption. In that case, the Court held that
same-sex relationships were equivalent to heterosexual relationships in
almost every respect, including parenting. Again, these findings
effectively silenced the expression of contrary opinions founded on
medical science. This decision, along with the key Supreme Court of
Canada decisions mentioned above, paved the way to changes in other
provincial and territorial jurisdictions.
Two years after Egan, the Supreme Court of Canada in Vriend acted
again in response to “hold out” jurisdictions, such as Alberta, that
refused to include sexual orientation as a protected category. The Court
followed up with M v. H to require equal treatment of same-sex and
opposite-sex partnerships.
In light of all this, the demand for same-sex marriage can be
understood as the next logical step in the gay and lesbian fight for
“equality” as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada and supported by
some provincial and territorial jurisdictions. As one gay activist put it:
“Marriage is the last frontier.”101
The same-sex marriage debate, however, has been unduly narrowed
from the start. The fact that various religious groups intervened in the
same-sex marriage trilogy, arguing that the recognition of same-sex
marriage could negatively impact the freedom of religion, resulted in the
reduction of the same-sex marriage debate to overly simplistic terms,
with opposition seen only as a fundamentalist religious reaction to “(evil,
sinful) lifestyles.”102 Some have even gone so far as to argue that
“religious underpinnings” to the prohibition against same-sex marriage
are the only “remaining barriers.”103 Both of these points will be
countered in Parts IV and V of this paper where it will be rationally
demonstrated that redefining marriage to include same-sex relationships
offends basic biological and psychological facts, authentic notions of
equality, and the dignity of the child, and will ultimately lead to a serious
and grave subversion of the social order.

101. Margaret Philip, Gay Adoption Breaks New Ground: Court Rulings Have Forced Most
Provinces to Allow Same-sex Couples to Adopt Children, GLOBE AND MAIL, July 9, 2001.
102. Barbara Finlay, All in the Family Values, 14 CAN. J. FAM. L. 129, 130 (1997).
103. Bruce MacDougall, The Separation of Church and Date: Destabilizing Traditional
Religion-Based Legal Norms On Sexuality, 36 U.B.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003).
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III. THE FUNDAMENTAL CRISIS
A. Introduction
The main problem in Canada is not the debate over same-sex
marriage per se. This phenomenon is simply the logical extension of a
Judeo-Christian culture in decay, one which has lost an authentic vision
of the human person – not only in terms of his or her true rights and
obligations, but also in regards to his or her deepest yearnings and
aspirations. The human person, created male and female, comes together
in marriage for the good of the spouses, children, and society. It is the
bedrock upon which Canadian institutional structures are founded whose
erosion, therefore, affects the stability of Canadian society.104 The
interrelationship between law and religion, an important part of this
foundation, has come apart at the seams and precipitated the dissolution
of the link between law and morals.105 Such a scenario threatens the very
integrity of the Canadian citizen who has become a subject “radically
separated from object, person from act, spirit from matter, emotion from
intellect, ideology from power, the individual from society.”106
The separation of law and religion, along with the subsequent
separation of law and morals,107 has had profound ramifications for
Canadian social structures and, in particular, the institution of marriage,
which requires the harmony of these elements for its support and
protection. Liberal philosopher Joseph Raz highlights this point when he
states: “‘Monogamy, assuming that it is the only valuable form of
marriage, cannot be practiced by an individual. It requires a culture
which recognizes it, and which supports it through the public’s attitude
and through its formal institutions.’”108
Raz’s argument raises two questions for the purposes of this paper: Is
there a Canadian constitutional framework that has protected and
supported marriage? If so, what is its philosophical underpinnings? To
address these two questions, the next part of this paper is divided into
two sections. Section B outlines the constitutional framework in which

104. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 18, at 16 (4.2).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2003)
(discussing how law is integrally bound up with culture and morals in reference to American
society).
108. Robert P. George, The Unorthodox Liberalism of Joseph Raz, in LIBERALISM AT THE
CROSSROADS: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL POLITICAL THEORY AND ITS
CRITICS 151, 155 (Christopher Wolfe &, John Hittinger eds., 1994) [hereinafter George, Unorthodox
Liberalism] 165 (quoting Joseph Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, 160 (Clarendon Press, 1986)).
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the institution of marriage is embedded. Section C focuses on the
philosophical foundation of the constitutional legal system and then
discusses changes in public attitudes.
B. The Constitutional Framework
Canada is a constitutional monarchy under the British Crown.109 The
head of state is the Queen, generally represented by the Governor
General, and the head of government is the prime minister. In essence the
Canadian system is a federal parliamentary-cabinet democracy founded
on the rule of law, which means that the arbitrary will of a person or
persons, including judges, is rejected in favor of the sovereignty of law.
As a Federal State, Canada brings together a number of different
political, religious and cultural communities, organized within ten
provinces110 and three territories,111 under a common central government.
In Canada there are two official languages (English and French) and two
legal systems: the common law system112 and the civil law system.113
The common law tradition has been adopted throughout Canada, except
in the province of Quebec, where the French civil law tradition prevails.
The rules of Canadian federalism are set out in the British North
America Act, 1867114 (renamed the Constitution Act, 1867 in 1982) that
accomplished Confederation and, together with its amendments, served
as Canada’s Constitution until 1982.115 The Constitution Act, 1867
109. This section presents a brief overview of the basic principles pertaining to the Canadian
legal framework as explained by FORSEY, supra note 1, and HOGG, supra note 19.
110. British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia,
Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island.
111. Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut.
112. The common law system derives from the English legal tradition. It is largely based on
judge-made law, which evolves over time through the decisions judges make in the cases brought
before them. As a result, together with law made by parliament, judicial precedents are one of the
most important sources of law in the common law system. Under this system, judges play an
important role both in developing case law and in interpreting legislation.
113. Under this system, the essential task of judges is to apply the Civil Code, the Québec
Charter of Human Rights and the Federal Criminal Code (modeled on the English common law
tradition). According to civil law Professor Ernest Caparros, the Code must be interpreted according
to its nature as a code, which is not equivalent to that of a mere statute. Ernest Caparros, La Cour
suprême le Code civil, in THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE OCTOBER 1985
CONFERENCE 107-13 (Gérald A. Beaudoin ed., Yvon Blais Inc., 1985). The role of the courts is to
apply the principles that are codified within the code, not to recast or reformulate them. Indeed, no
single judgment or set of judgments can cause a change in the law. The rule of precedent, stare
decisis, is not applicable in the civil law system since an isolated decision binds only the parties to
the dispute. Jurisprudence and writings of scholars play an important role in the interpretation of the
Code assuring the fruitfulness of the “sous-jacents.”
114. Constitution Act, R.S.C., app. II, No. 5, (1985) (Can.).
115. FORSEY, supra note 1, at 10-20. In particular, the Act contains provisions which establish
the structure and powers of the federal and provincial legislatures; vest formal executive power in
the Queen, creating her Privy Council for Canada (the legal foundation for the federal cabinet);
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established the rules for partial Canadian autonomy since amendments to
this Act were possible only through an act of the British Parliament and
final appeals were heard before the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in England until 1949.116 The Canada Act, 1982,117 a statute of
the British Parliament, incorporates the Constitution Act, 1982 as
Schedule B, terminating parliamentary authority of the United Kingdom
over Canada, provides an amending formula,118 and contains the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.
The Constitution Act, 1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982, then, are
the basic documents of Canada’s written constitution, which is
comprised of thirteen statutes in total. But these statutes are only part of
the full set of constitutional arrangements. For example, rules pertaining
to the Supreme Court of Canada, responsible government, the federal
cabinet, and political parties – all key features of the Canadian system –
are found elsewhere in imperial statutes, as well as orders, Canadian
statutes, custom, and jurisprudence.
1. Distribution of powers and marriage
Canadian legislative, executive, and judicial powers are separated
into three discrete bodies. At the federal level, for example, legislative
power resides in the House of Commons and the Senate, while executive
power rests in the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Of course, the Supreme
Court of Canada exercises the ultimate judicial power.
The powers are distributed according to the Constitution Act, 1867,
wherein federal and provincial legislative powers are distributed under
sections 91 and 92, respectively. The federal government is charged with
the common good of Canada, while the provincial or territorial
governments watch over particular interests, or the common good, in
their respective political communities or regions.
The family, founded on heterosexual marriage, predates Canadian
society and its confederation and is so fundamental to the Canadian
culture that both the federal and provincial governments share
jurisdiction. A review of the parliamentary debates prior to the passage
delineate the roles of the Queen’s representatives (the Governor-General for Canada and lieutenantgovernors for the provinces); grant parliament the power to establish the Supreme Court of Canada;
and guarantee limited language rights to the English and French, separate schools for Protestant and
Roman Catholic minorities in Quebec and Ontario, and the civil law system of Quebec.
116. See Alan C.Cairns, The Judicial Committee and Its Critics, 4 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 301
(1971).
117. Canada Act, (U.K.), 1982, c.11.
118. For a discussion of the variety of formal and informal amending procedures, see HOGG,
supra note 19, at 4-1 to 4-41. See also J. R. HURLEY, AMENDING CANADA’S CONSTITUTION:
HISTORY, PROCESSES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Minister of Supply and Services, 1996).
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of the Act reveals that marriage and solemnization were the subject
matters of considerable debate because they were something very
important to Canadians.119 The federal government has power over
“Marriage and Divorce” under Section 91(26) of the Constitution Act,
while the provinceshave power over the “Solemnization of Marriage”
under Section s. 92(12) of the same Act, which in essence reflects the
central role religion plays in protecting and supporting marriage.120
2. Common and civil law definitions of marriage
The Court of Appeal in the Halpern held that the definition of
marriage, within the Canadian common law tradition, derives from the
English common law definition, predating 1867 Constitution Act.121 The
English Court defined marriage in the 1866 Hyde v. Hyde case122 as “the
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all
others.” The definition has been followed and applied in Canadian courts
and, to this day, Canadian statutory law has not attempted a definition
since it has been assumed that marriage “is a concept so well understood
that definition would be superfluous.”123 The Halpern Court also held
that the “common law definition of marriage is reflected in s. 1.1 of the
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, which refers to the
definition of marriage as ‘the lawful union of one man and one woman to
the exclusion of all others.’”124The Hendricks’ decision duly noted that
the common law definition of marriage did not apply within the civil law
system. 125 The 1866 Civil Code of Lower Canada articulated the
conditions for the capacity to marry and while the the Code did not
define marriage, the Court drew inferences from article 115 of the 1866

119. The Attorney Generals made the argument in Halpern v. Canada (A.G.), Factum of the
Appellant, The Attorney General of Canada, and the Attorney General of Ontario, Docket Number:
C39172 and C39174, Toronto, 10 January 2003, at ¶ 25.
120. The Attorney General made the point in Halpern. Id. at ¶¶ 25-28. It was also noted that
the laws on marriage and solemnization are founded on the canon law of the Roman Catholic
Church, which also governed norms for marriage in England. Marriage was prohibited on a number
of grounds, for example, consanguinity or affinity, and polygamous or polyandrous relationships.
Eventually, clandestine marriages were prohibited by the English parliament. English statutes
dealing with the solemnization of marriage reflect the important role the Church played in
performing and recording marriages. Initially, then, English law on marriage established which
marriages within Canada were prohibited. See also BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 18,
at 225-30.
121. Halpern v. Can. [2003] 65 O.R. 3d. 161(Ont. C.A.) at ¶¶ 35-37.
122. Hyde v. Hyde, 1866, L.R. 1 P&D 130 at 133.
123. Halpern v. Can. (A.G.), Factum of the Appellant, The Attorney General of Canada, and
the Attorney General of Ontario, Docket Number: C39172 and C39174, Toronto, 10 January 2003,
at ¶ 21.
124. Halpern. [2003] 65 O.R. 3d. 161 (Ont. C.A.) at ¶ 37.
125. Hendricks v. Québec, [2002] R.J.Q. 2506, at ¶ 49.
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Code that marriage could not be contracted by persons of the same-sex:
“l’homme, avant l’âge de quatorze ans révolus, la femme, avant l’âge de
douze ans révolus, ne peuvent contracter mariage.”126(A man, before 14
years of age, and a woman, before 12 years of age, cannot enter into
marriage).
This provision continued in force after confederationbut the Quebec
Legislature eventually proposed amendments and from about 1981 to
1994, there were two civil codes in force: the Civil Code of Lower
Canada, with many of its articles on marriage still in force, and the
partial Civil Code of Quebec of 1980 dealing with family law. These two
Codes were latter repealed with the adoption of the Civil Code of Quebec
coming into force January 1, 1994. Acording to the 1994 Code, article
365(2) of provides: “Il ne peut l’etre qu’entre un homme et une femme
qui expriment publiquement leur cosentement libre et eclaire a cet
regard.”127 (Marriage may be contracted only between a man and a
woman openly expressing their free and enlightened consent).
Then on May 7, 2001, with a view to harmonizing the definition of
marriage in Quebec civil law with that of federal law, the federal
Parliament enacted the Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act.
Section 5 provides: “Le mariage requiert le consentement libre et éclairé
d’un homme et d’une femme à se prendre mutuellement pour époux.”128
(Marriage requires the free and enlightened consent of a man and a
woman to take each other as spouses).129
3. Marriage and constitutional amendment
The question raised is whether a constitutional amendment is
required in order for Parliament to change the definition of “Marriage” as
it is understood in s. 91 (26) of the Constitution Act 1867. The question
requires renewed evaluation given the findings of the Court of Appeal in
Halpern, which answered the query in the negative.130
126. Id. at ¶ 49.
127. Id. at ¶ 52.
128. Id. at ¶ 55.
129. It is noteworthy that on June 24, 2002, Quebec responded to the Supreme Court of
Canada decision M v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, ¶¶ 60-62, favouring same-sex relationships by enacting
legislation recognizing civil unions.
130. The position set out here is essentially that laid out in the written submissions of the
Interfaith Coalition for Marriage in EGALE. See for example its written submissions to the Supreme
Court of British Columbia, dated August 27, 2001, No. L002698, Vancouver Registry. The
arguments were accepted by Pitfield J. of the Supreme Court of British Columbia but rejected on
appeal. (For an academic critique of the decision see Jo-Anne Pickel, Judicial Analysis Frozen in
Time: EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 65 SASK. L. REV. 243 (2002)). Similar
arguments were made in Halpern and rejected. In particular, the Halpern Court found that the
question whether same-sex partners could marry was a matter of capacity which clearly fell within
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To this end, one must appreciate the principle of progressive
constitutional interpretation which has essentially been limited to two
basic situations: where an existing head of power has been ambiguous
and where it has involved an innovation incidental to the main head of
power. The leading case on the topic is Edwards v. Canada (A.G.)
wherein the Privy Council considered the meaning of “persons” and Lord
Sankey articulated the principle that the constitution “planted in Canada
a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits.”131
In that case, the Court considered the question whether women were
persons within the meaning of s. 24 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and
thus eligible for appointment to the Canadian Senate. It looked to the Act
itself as well as extraneous evidence and found that the authentic
meaning of person was inclusive of both sexes, male and female but that
the word “person” in the Constitution was ambiguous, sometimes
referring only to men while at other times alluding to women.
This is clearly distinguishable from the present debate where there is
nothing in the Canadian context, which permits a serious argument to be
made that the notion of marriage has ever been ambiguous as sometimes
referring to same-sex couples.132 Rather due to its very nature and
essence, marriage has only ever referred to opposite sex unions.
The principle of progressive interpretation has also been applied in
situations where an innovation has occurred which is incidental to the
main term. In Alberta (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), the Court considered the
definition of “banking” under s. 91(15) in relation to certain business
transactions, which involved loans to bank customers that exceeded the
liquid assets of a bank, and held that the question is not whether the
present innovation or style of banking was the same extent and kind as
Parliament’s power under “Marriage and Divorce” pursuant to s. 91 (26) of the Constitution Act,
1867, and was, therefore, an issue that could be changed by parliament. Furthermore, failure to
include same-sex couples would amount to “freez[ing] the definition of marriage to whatever
meaning it had to 1867” and would be contrary to the rules of constitutional interpretation, namely
the living tree approach, established in Edwards v. Can. (A.G.), and later reaffirmed by Dickson J. in
the 1984 Supreme Court of Canada case of Hunter v Southam wherein he noted that the constitution
must “‘be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social and political and
historical realities often unimagined by its framers.’” Halpern v. Can., [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161 at ¶ 42
(citing Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 155). In response to the argument that changing
the definition would allow the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to improperly invalidate provisions
of the Constitution, the Halpern Court held that “whatever compromises were negotiated to achieve
the legislative distribution of power relating to marriage, such compromises were not related to
constitutionally entrenching differential treatment between opposite-sex and same-sex couples.” Id.
at ¶ 48.
131. Edwards v. Can. (A.G.), [1930] 1 D.L.R. 98, 106-7 (emphasis added).
132. Similarly, in Reference as to Whether the term Indians in Head 24 of s. 91 of the British
North America Act, 1867 includes Eskimo inhabitants of the Province of Quebec [1939] S.C.R. 104,
the Court considered the meaning of the term “Indians” in the Constitution and found it to be
ambiguous.
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that in 1867 “but what is the meaning of the term itself in the Act” and
whether “subsequent developed styles” of banking was expressly
conferred.133
Again, this is distinguishable from the present debate where the
definition of marriage has never been ambiguous; it has always been
understood as the union between a woman and man, and in light of this
definition, same-sex marriage is not merely incidental to the original
meaning of marriage but rather expands the term well beyond its “natural
limits.” And thus constitutes an amendment, which requires the
invocation of proper constitutional amendments procedures.134
Moreover, the restriction against inclusion of same-sex unions can
not be seen as a mere issue of capacity and therefore within the
Parliament’s jurisdiction to change since by its very social and legal
nature marriage is a union between an opposite sex
couple.135Furthermore, the redefinition of marriage is insulated from
Charter review on the grounds that the Charter cannot be used to override
other Constitutional provisions.136
4. Marriage and parliamentary sovereignty
In Canadian representative democracy, parliamentary supremacy is a
fundamental principle that has remained in tack through s. 33 (the
“notwithstanding clause”) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
permits the Parliament and legislatures to override certain provisions of
the Charter, including s. 15.137
The Halpern decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, which
redefined marriage, and immediately legalized same-sex marriage in
Ontario, is an “especially egregious example of judicial activism” that
133. In Alta. (A.G.) v. Can. (A.G.), [1947] 4 D.L.R. 1, 9.
134. See also P.A.T.A. v. Can. (A.G.), [1931] A.C. 310 (Privy Council examined the notion of
“Criminal Law” under section 91 (27) and found that its definition was broad enough to cover new
crimes not enacted back in 1867); Toronto v. Bell Tel. Co. of Can. [1905] A.C. 52 (The Privy
Council found that telephones fell under 92 (10)(a) of “Other Workings and Undertakings.”).
135. To consider the treatment of this issue by the Halpern Court see supra note 130.
136. See, e.g., Bill 30 Reference, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148; Alder v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609.
For consideration of the point by the Halpern Court see supra note 130.
137. Section 33 may be invoked in cases regarding fundamental freedoms pertaining to
religion, conscience, expression, assembly, and association (s.2) as well as legal rights (ss. 7-14) and
equality rights (s. 15). It may not be applied in cases concerning democratic rights (ss. 3-5), mobility
rights (s. 6), or language rights (ss. 16-23). The override clause is subject to a temporal restriction;
after a period of five years, the legislature must expressly declare the re-enactment. To date,
however, s. 33 has rarely been used: about fifteen times in Quebec, once in Saskatchewan, Alberta,
and the Yukon Territory, respectively. This is most likely due to the constraints involved since
legislatures must expressly declare that the legislation shall apply notwithstanding the Charter
protection, thereby opening the door to controversy and public criticism. For a discussion of the s. 33
of the Charter see, HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 36-1 to 36-8.
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serves to underline that “Parliament, not the courts, is the place to forge
an appropriate legislative response to the complex and multi-layered
issues surrounding the public definition of marriage and the legal
recognition of same-sex unions.”138 While the issue is now properly
before Parliament, considerable damage has been done to parliamentary
supremacy through the granting of marriage licenses in Ontario, and the
comments by Justice Minister Martin Cauchon encouraging other
provinces to follow suit.
C. The Philosophical Underpinnings
Having studied the constitutional protection of marriage and having
found that the Halpern Court usurped the principle of parliamentary
supremacy and constitutional amendment procedures, let us consider the
nature and goals of the Federal State to determine what philosophical
changes, if any, the Halpern Court is promoting.
To this end, the 1956 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on
Constitutional Problems (hereinafter called the “Tremblay Report”) is of
particular relevance.139 This Commission, which was established in 1954
by the government of Quebec, had the specific goal of buttressing
Quebec’s claim “to provincial primacy in the field of direct taxation.”140
The Commission’s report, however, is not remarkable for the central
argument on this point. But rather, as Professor of Political Science
David Kwavnik notes, what is exceptional is the report’s attempt “to
expound the unarticulated major premises of a society’s existence and to
justify these premises by reference to what it believed to be the absolute
and immutable standards of eternal verity.”141
According to the Commission, the “heart of the question” is the
philosophy of man and society underlying “federalism as a system of
social organization.”142 To quote from the Report:
What kind of man and what kind of society do we want? What kind of
civilization do we claim to be building? On the answers we make, in
practice, to these questions in our daily life depends the fate of our
political system because . . . federalism implies a certain concept of
138. Daniel Cere & Douglas Farrow, Statement on the Status of Marriage in Canada, Institute
for the Study of Marriage, Law and Culture, at http://www.marriageinstitute.ca/pages/stmt.htm
(Jun. 18, 2003).
139. See DAVID KWAVNIK, THE TREMBLAY REPORT (McClelland & Steward, 1973); See also
Tremblay Report and Provincial Autonomy In The Duplessis Era (1956), at
http://www2.marianopolis.edu/quebechistory/readings/
tremblay.htm.
140. Id. at viii.
141. Id. at vii.
142. Id. at 87.

10ADOLPHE.MACRO

510

5/26/2004 12:20 AM

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 18

Man and Society and it can only expand and maintain itself where this
concept flourishes.143

The central organizing principle of federalism144 is not a promotion
of uniformity or individualism, but rather association between
individuals and groups founded on four philosophical bases: “the
Christian concept of man and of society, the fact of social life’s variety
and complexity of social life, the idea of the common good, and the
principle of the subsidiary function of every community.”145
1. From Christianity to the cult of self
Canadian society is founded on a Judeo-Christian belief system,146
which embraces a profound understanding of the dignity of the human
person. According to Scripture, man —created male and female—is
made in the image and likeness of God through an act of love and is
called to eternal life. These two propositions serve as the foundation for a
rich teaching on the origin, nature, and end of the human being in what is
commonly referred to as the Christian anthropological view.147
In brief, this means that a human being has a nature different from
other creatures. Possessing both body and soul, a person is endowed with
conscience, reason, and free will in order to know what is good and then
to do what is good. Something of the divine is reflected in the human
being who feels himself drawn toward personal relationship with God as
his ultimate end. Communion, then, is a requirement of human nature,
and man is fundamentally a social being. This is evident in marriage
where a man and woman come together to form an intimate union of
love and life in a complementarity ordered toward the good of children,
society, and the spouses themselves. For this reason, marriage is a
sacrament constituted by the freely contracted and publicly expressed
indissoluble bond of matrimony. As the first community of persons,
marriage is the fundamental unit of society, predating the State. Like
143. Id.
144. The Commission asked the questions: What is Canada? What is meant by Confederation?
The answer to these questions was essentially that Canada is a country and legal and social
framework in which various communities with their own particularities would attend to daily needs
of the citizens (i.e., family, school) and would live together under a central government that
respected the local jurisdictions while providing general services (i.e., administrative, military and
technological). Id. at xi-xii.
145. Id. at 1-32 to 1-36.
146. See, e.g., BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 18 (discussing Western legal
tradition).
147. For a biblical analysis on the meaning of the human body, see for example JOHN PAUL II,
THE THEOLOGY OF THE BODY: HUMAN LOVE IN THE DIVINE PLAN (Pauline Books & Media, 1997).
For a commentary on THE THEOLOGY OF THE BODY, see CHRISTOPHER WEST, THEOLOGY OF THE
BODY EXPLAINED (Pauline Books & Media, 2003).
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ripples in a pond, families create more families, which are then organized
into villages, towns, cities, states and nations.
The Christian anthropological view does not depend on divine
revelation alone, but on reason. Throughout the ages, numerous married
couples of every religious and non-religious persuasion have given
witness to freely contracted and publically expressed total (life long),
faithful (monogamous), and fruitful (procreative) marital love. In other
words, even one who does not embrace the Christian faith can reasonably
conclude that the human person is made for a love which involves the
intellectual, spiritual, and emotional union of man and woman founded
on the physical union through reproductive type acts. And that such a
love grows deeper in the sharing of the joys and troubles of daily life
within the context of a faithful and an exclusive partnership for life.
Further, one can reasonably ascertain that the begetting and education
of children contributes to the welfare of both parents and society. And
that responsible parenthood is tied to knowledge of and respect for the
biological life-giving functions involved in the transmission of life as
well as to the correlative rights/duties of spouses to each other, their
children, and society at large. Lastly, one can reasonably grasp that
certain tendencies of instinct and passion in relations between a man and
woman , outside as well as inside marriage should be dominated by
reason and will. At one time, the Canadian tradition harmonized faithbased and rational perspectives in their insistence that natural or common
sense motives for action are assisted by adherence to one’s duties to God
and neighbor and respect for the objective moral order. The “sexual
revolution” in the 1960’s, however, challenged the authentic nature of
conjugal love, as well as sexual morals relating to marriage. The 1960’s
saw the emergence of a more superficial understanding of human
sexuality based primarily on the pleasure principle. As a result, mastery
of self through reason and will was viewed as repressive and “old
school,” and the begetting of children began to be seen as an unnecessary
burden. With the advent of artificial birth control148 and abortion, nonmarital sexual relationships and marital infidelity became easier and
avoidance of pregnancy was expected. This, in turn, led to increased
rates of marriage breakdown (separation and divorce) and the forming of
new family relationships, blended re-married families, single parent
148. For a recent discussion on contraception and its link with same-sex marriage see SameSex Marriage and Its Relation With Contraception: Janet E. Smith Links Rejection of “Humanae
Vitae” to Acceptance of Homosexuality, Zenit News Agency, at www.zenit.org/english/
vsualizza.phtml?sid=43006 (Oct. 17, 2003); Bishop Victor Galeone, Marriage: A Communion of
Life and Love, in When Spouses Speak the Truth With Their Bodies: Bishop Victor Galeone on
at
www.zenit.org/english/
God’s
Plan
for
Marriage,
Zenit
News
Agency,
visualizza.phtml?sid=44188, (Nov. 11, 2003).
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families, and de facto unions. These radical changes in family form
interfaced with the law as it attempted to resolve disputes between nonmarital cohabitants, as well as issues pertaining to the use of new assisted
reproductive technology and surrogate motherhood.
These developments, among others (i.e., industrialization, economic
independence of women, and so forth), provoked Harvard Professor
Mary Ann Glendon to study “the new family” which she ultimately
described as having “increasing fluidity, detachability and
interchangeability.”149 She noted that the reduced and loose bonds
between persons applied to relationships between: (1) parents, (2)
children and parents, and (3) relatives and families.150 She argued that the
net effect was an increased emphasis on the autonomy of individuals
rather than the community life of the family (nuclear or extended). This
led her to conclude that the “new family” would be transitional and
“identified with a period of extreme separation of . . . man from
nature.”151
It can be said, therefore, that in a certain sense the gay and lesbian
community is correct in raising “a sharp moral challenge to the hypocrisy
and decadence of our culture . . . that the sexual license extended to
‘straights’ cannot be denied to them.”152 However, the sexual acts of
homosexuals and lesbians have there own particular bent in so far as they
offend basic biology. Further, the answer to the dilemma is not more of
the same societal decay, but rather a return to common sense positions
about the authentic notion of human dignity, and the proper meaning of
love and marriage. The Halpern Court does not provide this common
sense position but rather embraces gender ideology and defines human
dignity in a completely subjective manner that actually demeans the
richness of humanity and thereby furthers the crisis.
What is gender ideology? In contemporary usage, the term “gender”
denotes that “one’s biological sex is a natural given” while all other sexrelated differences, such as masculinity, femininity, manhood,
womanhood, motherhood, fatherhood, and heterosexuality are culturally
149. HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 (5th ed. 2003).
150. Id. at 1-8.
151. Id. at 8.
152. Hadley Arkes et al., The Homosexual Movement: A Response by the Ramsey Colloquium,
41 FIRST THINGS Mar. 1994, at 51-21. (The Institute on Religion and Public Life sponsors the
Ramsey Colloquium which is a group of Jewish and Christian thinkers who meet periodically to
discuss issues of public life, morality, and religion. Other scholars who participated in the
Colloquium on this question include: Rabbi David Dalin, Ernest Fortin, Jorge Garcia, Rabbi Marc
Gellman, Robert George, Rev. Hugh Haffenreffer, John Hittinger, Russell Hittinger, Robert Jenson,
Gilbert Meilaender, Jerry Muller, Fr. Richard J. Neuhaus, Rabbi David Novak, James Neuchterlein,
Max Stackhouse, Philip Turner, George Weigel, Robert Wilken). See also Patrick Fagan, A Culture
of Inverted Sexuality, at http://catholiceducation.org/articles/sexuality/se0049.html (2000).
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constructed “gender roles” and, hence, artificial and arbitrary.153 This
approach to human sexuality is clearly borrowing from radical feminism
ideology where the word “gender” has become “the focus of the feminist
revolution.”154 From a gender perspective, motherhood, a vocation
necessarily unique to women, is frequently undermined by this kind of
thinking since the goal of statistical equality between men and women in
the work force, women’s autonomy, and access to political power can
never be met “if even a significant percentage of women choose
mothering as their primary vocation.”155 From this perspective, then,
being a man or woman is not determined primarily by sex but by a
culture, which has inordinately influenced people’s choices on how they
live out being a man or woman.
153. The term has been defined as follows: “Gender is a concept that refers to a system of
roles and relationships between women and men that are determined not by biology but the social,
political and economic context. One’s biological sex is a natural given: gender is constructed . . .
gender can be seen as the process by which individuals . . . are born into biological categories of . . .
women and men through the acquisition of locally defined attributes of masculinity and femininity”
UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF WOMEN, Gender Concepts in Development Planning: Basic Approach, U.N. Doc.
Instraw/SER.B/50, U.N. Sales No. 96.III.C.1 (1995), available at http://www.uninstraw.org/en/resources/publications.html#a7 [hereinafter, “INSTRAW”]. See also DALE O’LEARY,
THE GENDER AGENDA: DEFINING EQUALITY 120 (Vital Issues Press, 1997) (discussing the
development of the term in feminist literature and its employment within the context of UN
conferences, i.e., the Cairo and Beijing Conferences.); MARTHA L. DE CASCO et al., EMPOWERING
WOMEN: CRITICAL VIEWS ON THE BEIJING CONFERENCE (Little Hills Press, 1995) (similar analysis
within the scope of the Beijing Conference); ROSEMARIE PUTNAM TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A
MORE COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (Westview Press, 2d ed. 1989) (brief overview of feminist
thought); HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Rebecca J.
Cook ed., University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) (overview of feminist thought in the field of
human rights).
154. O’Leary, supra note 153, at 120. It is important to note that the term “gender” may mean
different things to different people. For example, many who participate within the United Nations
system, especially those who work at the local level, may understand the term to mean simply male
and female. In the countries of Africa, for instance, it is common knowledge that girls do not, as a
general rule, receive the same level of education as boys and so references to “gender
discrimination” or initiatives designed specifically for the “girl child” may seem reasonable. For
further discussion of this point in reference to the Convention on the Rights of the Child see Jane
Adolphe, The Holy See and the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Moral Problems in
Negotiation and Implementation, (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with the Linacre Center
and author).
155. Id. at 120-21. This deconstruction of motherhood is a recurring theme in the INSTRAW
booklet, where the following quote from Maureen Macintosh appears: “[N]othing in the fact that
women bear children implies that they exclusively should care for them throughout childhood . . .”
INSTRAW, supra note 153, at 18. The booklet continues: “The fact of sexual difference is used to
arbitrarily limit women’s autonomy, economic activities and access to political power” Id. at 19. To
eradicate the problem, INSTRAW advocates increasing, “[w]omen’s access to political and
economic power” and the development of a “broad view of human reproduction activities,”
including abortion and contraceptive services, thus articulating the connection between production
and reproduction Id. at 21-22. O’Leary’s review of feminist literature reveals that any woman who
aspires to mothering is seen as a threat to other women who have not been so “socially conditioned
to want the wrong things” O’Leary, supra note 153, at 124. For a review of some of the feminist
literature, see TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, (Catharine A. MacKinnon, ed. 1989).
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It is this line of reasoning that won out in the Supreme Court of
Canada cases dealing with sexual orientation and in this way, the very
basis of traditional notions of marriage, the family, and interpersonal
relationships of every kind are attacked and undermined. The Halpern
case furthers the onslaught by defining the notion of human dignity in a
completely subjective manner, namely as self-respect and in so doing
thereby reduces the role of the State to recognizing individual choices
regardless of their content. And the individual right of equality, based on
this faulty notion of human dignity, is given priority over the State’s
fundamental duty to protect the institution of marriage.
2. From unity in diversity to relativity in pluralism
Canada brings together a number of different political, religious, and
cultural communities, organized within ten provinces156 and three
territories157 under a common central government. From its inception,
respect for the principle of unity in diversity has been a constant
preoccupation and struggle. Back in 1667, Intendent Talon made the
following comments in regard to New France: “I work as much as I can
to unite the isolated settlements and bring them closer together . . . The
People are a medley being composed of several elements . . . the
temperaments of which do not always accord, they seemed to me quite
united for the whole length of my sojourn.”158
With the successive generations of immigration in Canada and the
ongoing mix of cultures, values, and traditions, an authentic pluralism
and tolerance was necessary to ensure dialogue between the various
sectors of society, including the civil and religious traditions in which
Canadians are rooted. Unfortunately, in recent times, a form of pluralism
has come to be promoted in Canada which is antagonistic not only
towards religion, but more seriously, to objective truth discernable by
right reason.This is born out in the following comments found on the
website of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:
The foundation that supported foreign policy in the past has eroded: the
old external military threat posed by the confrontation of superpowers
has all but gone; ideologies and religion do not unify; nor in many
countries, is ethnic identity held in common. In countries like Canada,
unity springs from pride in the civil nationality – based on shared

156. British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia,
NewFoundland, Prince Edward Island.
157. North West Territories, Yukon and Nunavut.
OF
CANADA,
A
TIME
FOR
ACTION,
(1978)
at
158. GOVERNMENT
http:www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/Proposals/tfa.html (quote is taken from the
Prologue of this document which outlines, among other things, the reasons for the new constitution).
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values and tolerance, respect for rule of law and thoughtful compromise
– that its citizens share.159

We have here the appearance of a disingenuous notion of tolerance
that bases civil nationality not on objective truths, but on “shared
values.”160 In reality, this kind of tolerance, namely, moral neutrality
(i.e., the rejection of the duty/right to judge between good and evil) is
logically and practically impossible;161 it necessarily opposes objective
truths and leads inevitably to the oppression of those who refuse to
compromise in order to reach a so-called consensus of values.162
In the same-sex marriage debate, a judicial minority has so far
largely determined what is to be regarded as just and true. When the
Parliament and other legislatures fail to override judicial overreaching,
Canadians live under an altered constitutional system based on a new
ideology not defined or desired by government but rather developed in
an ad hoc manner through case law. As scholar Russel Hittinger notes in
the American context, such a profound change in constitutional law “is

159. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian Foreign Policy Review
(1995), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/chap1-en.asp (last visited Jan. 15,
2004).
160. See J. BUDZISZEWSKI, TRUE TOLERANCE: LIBERALISM AND THE NECESSITY OF
JUDGMENT 5, (2000) (“True tolerance is one of the virtues. Virtues are complex dispositions of
character, deeply ingrained habits by which people call upon all of their passions and capacities in
just those ways that aid, prompt, inform, and execute their moral choices instead of clouding them,
misleading them, or obstructing their execution.” The notion presupposes “that there are objective
goods and evils, objective rights and wrongs, sometimes harder and sometimes easier to discern.”).
161. The liberal tradition has come under heavy attack by those who argue that the claim of
neutrality is a fallacy. The point is succinctly put by Notre Dame Law Professor Gerard Bradley
when he submits that the proposition, “law ought to be morally neutral about marriage, or anything
else for that matter, is itself a moral claim.” GERARD V. BRADLEY, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: OUR
FINAL ANSWER IN SAME-SEX ATTRACTION 124 (John F. Harvey & Gerard V. Bradley, eds. 2003).
162. A similar idea is articulated by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger stating:
The “end of metaphysics,” which in broad sectors of modern philosophy is superimposed
as an irreversible fact, has led to juridical positivism which today, especially, has taken
on the form of the theory of consensus: if reason is no longer able to find the way to
metaphysics as the source of law, the State can only refer to the common convictions of
its citizens’ values, convictions that are reflected in the democratic consensus. Truth does
not create consensus, and consensus does not create truth as much as it does a common
ordering. The majority determines what must be regarded as true and just. In other words,
law is exposed to the whim of the majority, and depends on the awareness of the values
of the society at any given moment, which in turn is determined by a multiplicity of
factors. This is manifested concretely by the progressive disappearance of the
fundamentals of law inspired in the Christian tradition. Matrimony and family are the
increasingly less accepted form of statutory community.
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, On the Crisis of Law, Address on the Occasion of Being Conferred the
Degree of Doctor Honoris Causa by the LUMSA Faculty of Jurisprudence in Rome, (Nov. 10,
1999), at http:www.cin.org/docs/ratzlaw.html.
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often hidden by political and judicial rhetoric.”163 Certainly, in the samesex debate, gender ideology has been promoted through the courts with
the assistance of rights rhetoric. In the case of same-sex marriage, one
may argue that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is “being used as a
tool of cultural genocide”164 to condemn cultural, religious, and moral
beliefs and practices which do not conform.
3. From the common good to consensus
Jacques Maritain articulates the central idea of the common good
when he argues “[t]here is a correlation between this notion of the person
as a social unit and the notion of the common good as the end of the
social whole. They imply one another.”165 The human person finds
himself in serving the group, and the group attains its goal only by
serving the person. Part of the group’s service of man is the realization
that every human being has aspects, which go beyond the group, as well
as an ultimate calling that the group does not encompass.166 According to
Maritain, that which constitutes the common good and promotes the
perfection of man’s life and liberty includes public services (i.e., roads,
schools), structures (i.e., governmental bodies, military power), good
customs, just laws, wise institutions, cultural treasures and heritage, as
well as basic human virtues and civic rights and responsibilities. In brief,
the common good presupposes respect for the human person, requires
social development of the group, and promotes stability and security
through a just political order; the term “common good,” therefore, does
not refer to the sum total of individual interests, but rather, to an
assessment of particular values and their integration with other values in
balanced association with the human person in his or her social nature.
The loss of the sense of objective truth and the meaning of human
dignity have made it difficult for the Canadian government to make

163. Russel Hittinger, A Crisis of Legitimacy, 67 FIRST THINGS Nov. 1996, at 25-29. See also
ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES (A.E.I. Press, 2003)
(discussing judicial activism which includes treatment of the Canadian situation).
164. David M. Smolin, Will International Human Rights Be Used as a Tool of Cultural
Genocide? The Interaction of Human Rights Norms, Religion, Culture and Gender, 12 J. L. &
RELIGION 143 (1995-96) (arguing that human rights instruments are being used as a tool of cultural
genocide which raises the question whether a nation’s own bill or charter of rights may be
manipulated so as to accomplish the same thing).
165. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 49 (1946) [hereinafter,
MARITAIN, COMMON GOOD]. See also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 155
(1980) [hereinafter JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW] (defining the common good as “a set of conditions
that enables the members of a community to attain for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which
they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively or negatively) in a community.”);
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 1905-1912 (Doubleday, 1995).
166. MARITAIN, COMMON GOOD, supra note 165, at 66.

10ADOLPHE.MACRO

479]

5/26/2004 12:20 AM

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN CANADA

517

decisions aimed at the common good. Instead of examining a question on
the criteria of justice and the common good, decisions are made in
accordance with other criteria, such as tolerance based on the willful
ignorance of important differences, or the interests of individuals and
minority groups wielding considerable financial influence and power, or
the claims of others promoting a liberal ideology. Indeed, due to the fear
of public criticism, section 33 has not been used to avoid the
implementation of judicial decisions, which are not in the interest of the
common good. This has resulted in a domino effect bringing the samesex marriage debate to where it stands today. Common good arguments
that justify state protection and support for the traditional definition of
marriage are no longer valid before the courts. This is born out in
Halpern where, under the s. 1 analysis, courts repeatedly rejected the
common good position articulated by the various state agencies.167
4. From subsidiarity to the individualistic welfare state
The Canadian government’s action in these matters has not been
tempered with due attention to the principle of subsidiarity. This
principle maintains that a community at a higher level (i.e., the Canadian
federal government) should not interfere in the daily life of a lower level
community (i.e., the natural family), thereby depriving it of its own
purposes and functions. On the contrary, the higher level community
should support and assist the lower level community with a view to the
common good. This thinking is based on common sense: those who are
closest to a situation can best understand the problems involved and lend
the necessary assistance which, in many cases, may involve emotional as
well as financial support.
As previously discussed, laying the groundwork for acceptance of
same-sex marriage involved key changes that were promoted through the
vehicle of court challenges to state benefits on the grounds of equality.
However, through the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, the
167. For a succinct example of a common good analysis pertaining to marriage see Egan v.
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at 536, 538-39, where Justice LaForest states:
[Marriage] is firmly anchored in the biological and social realities that heterosexual
couples have the unique ability to procreate, that most children are the product of these
relationships, and that they are generally cared for and nurtured by those who live in that
relationship. In this sense, marriage is by nature heterosexual. It would be possible to
legally define marriage to include homosexual couples, but this would not change the
biological and social realities that underlie the traditional marriage . . . . None of the
couples excluded from benefits under the Act are capable of meeting the fundamental
social objectives thereby sought to be promoted by Parliament. These couples
undoubtedly provide mutual support for one another, and that, no doubt, is of some
benefit to society. They may, it is true, occasionally adopt or bring up children, but this is
exceptional and in no way affects the general picture.
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gay and lesbian community has received benefits almost equivalent to
marriage. To carry the benefits issue to it logical conclusion, the 2001
Report of the Law Reform Commission entitled “Beyond Conjugality”
argues that it is time for governments to go beyond the traditional
understanding of marriage and create legal structures to support a broad
range of “close personal relationships.”168
This suggestion completely dismantles the notion of marriage-based
family as society’s fundamental social unit, replacing it with individual
interest. What follows is a dramatic increase in bureaucracy as well as
government spending to provide for all relationships, regardless of need
and contribution to the public good. Also ignored is the fact that the
government has a fundamental concern for children and the development
of their character through nurture and education so that they may
responsibly and effectively participate in the political process; raising
children is not simply another lifestyle choice.169
5. Summary and implications
This part of the paper has traced the erosion of the Judeo-Christian
foundation in Canadian society by first emphasizing how the institution
of marriage is embedded in the Canadian constitutional framework.
Secondly, it has shown how the Judeo-Christian belief system, founded
on a vision of the human person, based on faith and reason, has been
undermined and replaced by pure relativism, which leaves Canadian
society adrift without any moral and legal compass. In particular, there
has been a philosophical transformation from the Christian concept of
man to the cult of self; from respect for variety and diversity to a faulty
notion of pluralism that embraces relativity; from the idea of the
common good to that of consensus, and from respect for the principle of
subsidiary to its rejection in favor of a welfare state that promotes the
individual rather than the family, as the fundamental unit of society.

168. LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING
CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001), available at http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/pr/
cpra/report.asp (last updated Jun. 25, 2002).
169. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991) (discussing these points in the American context). But, see Robert A. Licht,
Rights and Wrongs About Rights, 20 FIRST THINGS Feb. 1992, at 48-52 (critiquing Mary Ann
Glendon’s book).
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IV. TOWARDS A NEW PHILOSOPHY
A. Introduction
What then is the Halpern decision really promoting? This part will
explore how the gay and lesbian community in Canada is divided in
their approach to the question of same-sex marriage. By way of a brief
overview, there are two different trends mutually opposed in their sociopolitical foundational principles : the liberal and the libertarian. The
former argues that same-sex couples are equivalent to opposite-sex
relationships and that marriage should be redefined in an inclusive
manner. On the other hand, libertarians argue that both types of
relationship are fundamentally different and that marriage should be
abolished as an antiquated and “homophobic” institution. They suggest
that in its place a state registration system should be erected which would
confer benefits to all close personal relationships. While differing in their
socio-political perspective on same-sex marriage, the two positions agree
with the fundamental assumption that there can be no objective
discussion on what it means to be a human person. They both push for
the institutionalization of a universal ethic that offers no workable
philosophy for society since they reject right from wrong, female from
male, and normality from deviancy. The answer to the dilemma lies in
returning to authentic definitions of the human person, and marriage, and
a clearer vision of the role of the State.
B. The Liberal (Assimilation) Approach
Some same-sex couples claim that the law should clearly show its
acceptance of the fact that same-sex attraction is not a disease, or the
symptom of a personality disorder, but rather, normal and very similar to
opposite-sex attraction. Consequently, rather than merely tolerating
same-sex relationships as a private reality, the Canadian government has
a legal obligation to ensure that the law does not discriminate against
couples on the basis of their identity or sexual orientation. Same-sex
relationships should be openly and freely accepted, as are heterosexual
relationships, and the institution of marriage, which they purport to
value, should be opened up to homosexuals since many same-sex
cohabitants are already living in long-term, loving relationships, and
raising children. At the heart of this argument is the proposition that,
were the Canadian government to do anything less than radically alter
the traditional notion of the family based on heterosexual marriage, it
would necessarily show a profound lack of respect and concern for the

10ADOLPHE.MACRO

520

5/26/2004 12:20 AM

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 18

dignity of homosexuals as persons, effectively reducing them to secondclass citizens and, thereby, destroying their self-esteem.
The methodology behind this argument is twofold: on the one hand,
it seeks to align its case with the point of view of those at the margins of
society; on the other hand, it hones in on the actual experience of those
living in the context of long-term, same-sex relationships, thereby
avoiding any reference to objective truths or universal values.170 This
approach translates into the argument that “marriage” means different
things to different people and that the current legal definition of marriage
presumes a static set of facts, namely, that a man and a woman marry in
order to reproduce – a notion that does not correspond to current
realities.171 Men and woman do not marry solely for the purpose of
reproduction; many marriages are childless, and often couples re-marry
when they are beyond child-bearing years. People marry for a number of
reasons: love, companionship, stability, financial and emotional support,
and sometimes to reproduce. Hence, the best that the State can do is to
adopt a flexible or functional approach to the definition of marriage.172
As noted above, this is essentially the line of argumentation that won out
in the Halpern case.
C. The Libertarian (Anti-Assimilation) Approach
Other same-sex proponents claim that homosexuality is normal
though different from heterosexuality, that the government has a legal
obligation to protect people from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, that same-sex relationships should be accepted as fully as
heterosexual relationships, and that the legal institution of marriage
should be abolished. Indeed, this group “oppose[s] the idea of same-sex
marriage as a tribute to a sexist and homophobic institution.”173
Once again, the methodology here is to argue from the fringe,
buttressing the argument with reference to the experience of those who
are living together with no legal status in “close personal relationships.”
Some advocates of this view suggest that the institution of marriage be
replaced with a private contract, ascription, or an optional state
registration scheme by which heterosexual and homosexual couples

170. See Joy Freeman, Defining Family in Mossop v. DSS: The Challenge of AntiEssentialism and Interactive Discrimination for Human Rights Litigation, in DAVID DYZENHAUS &
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, LAW AND MORALITY: READINGS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 15.4 (2d ed. 2001).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Freeman, supra note 170, at 461 (Freeman makes clear that she is not a proponent of this
approach).

10ADOLPHE.MACRO

479]

5/26/2004 12:20 AM

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN CANADA

521

alike, as well as a wide range of other relationships, can be protected and
supported.
As we have seen, this line of thinking is behind the 2001 the
“Beyond Conjugality” report, which argues that the narrow focus on
spousal or conjugal relationships does not promote the State’s interest in
close personal relationships because it excludes other important
relationships.174 To justify the State’s abolition of marriage, the report
argues that “[t]he State’s interest in marriage is not connected to the
promotion of a particular conception of appropriate gender roles, nor is it
to reserve procreation and the raising of children to marriage;” rather, the
State has an interest in ordering private affairs by “providing an orderly
framework in which people can express their commitment to each other,
receive public recognition and support, and voluntarily assume a range of
legal rights and obligations.”175
D. Critique
Francesco D’Agostino, philosophy of law professor, argues that both
the same-sex positions fall within the liberal tradition; however, each
position supports same-sex marriage from a completely different sociopolitical perspective.176 The first position relies heavily on a classical
liberal tradition that concentrates in theory and practice on a form of
government which is inspired by a pluralistic vision of society which
inherently embodies individualism, moral relativism, and anti-religious
sentiment.177 Similarly, Joy Freeman, a lawyer, argues that challenges to
the traditional family involve a postmodernist or deconstructionist
paradigm178 which rejects the proposition “that what is tradition is natural
and therefore good,” on the grounds that such a position suppresses

174. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 168, at 9 (found in Executive
Summary).
175. Id. at 23-24. The report recommends a registration scheme as the best solution to accord
legal recognition to a full range of these relationships which include those who are married or live
with conjugal partners, (both same-sex and heterosexual relationships), in addition to those who
share a home with parents, other relatives, friends, and caregivers (i.e., in the case of the elderly and
disabled, id. at 21-25). Should the State not be willing to abolish marriage immediately then, in the
interim, the report suggests that marriage be redefined in order to include same-sex couples, id. at
23-25).
176. Francesco D’Agostino, Should the Law Recognize Homosexual Unions? in CHRISTIAN
ANTHROPOLOGY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 85-87 (L’OSSERVATORE ROMANO REPRINTS COLLECTION
BY MARIO AGNES), (L’OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Vatican City, 1997).
177. Id. at 85-86.
178. Freeman, supra note 170, at 465.
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others.179 Freeman also argues that the range of “relationships between
normality and deviance . . . is hierarchical, and socially constructed.”180
The second approach, embodied in the “Beyond Conjugality”
Report, one might argue is highly utopian and founded on libertarian and
anti-law sentiment. Same-sex marriage would presumably be the first
step in eventually eliminating the need for family law – the beginning of
an absolutely new model of social living based on a radical individualism
liberated from the weight of the law.181
However, as time passes, they both show their true face in a push
for the institutionalization of a seemingly universal sexual ethic that
recognizes and protects personal choices without giving preference to
any of them. In order to institutionalize this universal ethic, law must be
reformulated – along with the traditional institutions it has historically
protected and supported.
Bruce MacDougall, law professor and gay rights advocate, takes this
position to its logical conclusion when he argues that rules relating to all
sexual unions need to be re-examined:
As gay and lesbian unions are being legally recognized, so rules
respecting other forms of unions, polygamous, incestuous, and so on
will be re-examined . . . such as transsexual and transgendered persons.
As some religious institutions are deemed to be government actors, and
thereby made subject to constitutional norms like s. 15 of the Charter,
so other ‘private’ institutions and organisations will face the same
treatment and teachings and attitudes about sexuality in those
institutions will be challenged.182

Pedophilia is presently a subject matter open to debate. In order to
advance their agenda for decriminalization of pedophilia, man-boy love
advocates have been relying upon the deconstructionist type of
argumentation when they claim that age is arbitrary.183 And they have
received support in the medical community, in which the question
whether pedophilia should be removed from the forthcoming edition of
the psychiatric manual for disorders was recently debated at a
symposium sponsored by the American Psychiatric Association.184
179. Id.
180. Id. at 466.
181. D’Agostino, supra note 176, at 85-86.
182. Bruce MacDougall, The Separation of Church and Date: Destablilizing Traditional
Religion-Based Legal Norms on Sexuality, 36 U.B.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003).
183. See, e.g., the North American Man-boy Love Association (NAMBLA), at
http://www.nambla.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
184. For example, an article entitled “A Meta-analytic Examination of Assumed Properties of
Child Sexual Abuse Using College Samples” was recently published in the American Psychological
Association’s Psychological Bulletin, which concluded that “negative effects [of sexual abuse] were
neither pervasive nor typically intense.” For a discussion of this study see: Joseph Nicolosi, Dale
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Having denounced the distinctions between right and wrong,
normality and deviancy, and male and female as being hierarchical and
socially constructed, that is, artificial and meaningless, those who
maintain these distinctions and cling to traditional structures must be
challenged and suppressed. The suppression of contrary thought is
clearly evident in current discourse when those who provide reasoned
arguments are dismissed outright for being “homophobic” or for
promoting hatred.185
E. The Universal Approach
1. Authentic meaning of human dignity
In terms of what the two approaches have in common, D’Agostino
argues that they share a tragic presupposition typical of modernity: “Both
O’Leary, On the Pedophilia Issue: What the APA Should Have Known, at http://www.narth.com.
Furthermore, in May 2003, the American Psychiatric Association hosted a symposium in San
Francisco that discussed whether pedophilia should be removed from the upcoming categories of
mental illness. For a discussion of this event see: Linda Ames Nicolosi, Should These Conditions Be
Normalized: American Psychiatric Association Symposium Debates Whether Pedophilia, Gender
Identity Disorder, Sexual Sadism Should Remain Mental Illnesses at http://www.narth.com. On the
same website also see: Linda Ames Nicolosi, The Pedophilia Debate Continues – And DSM is
Changed Again; Linda Ames, Nicolosi, International Academy of Sex Research Joins the Debate: Is
Pedophilia a Mental Disorder? and finally see the paper on The Problem of Pedophilia. See also a
recent article discussing the battle of pedophiles to gain acceptance in society, Russ Flanagan, I’m
Tired of Being Force into the Shadows by Society, THE EXPRESS-TIMES, February 22, 2004,
http://www.nj.com/specialprojects/expresstimes/index.ssf?/news/expresstimes/stories/moleters1_oth
erside.html.
185. See, e.g., Vancouver Archbishop Threatened, CBC NEWS BRITISH COLUMBIA, Oct. 2,
2003, available at http://vancouver.cbc.ca. Threats were made against Archbishop Adam Exner
when he announced that the Catholic Church would cut a program in church schools that was
supporting the gay and lesbian community. The Chicago Sun-times accused the Pope of a launching
a global hate campaign against gays. See Headline Saying Pope Attacks Gays Draws Ire of Chicago
Cardinal, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 4, 2003, available at http://www.catholicnews.com. Dr.
Peter Forster, the Bishop of Chester, Great Britain, was put under criminal investigation for his
remarks that homosexuals should seek medical treatment to “reorientate” themselves. See Richard
Alleyne, Bishop’s Anti-Gay Comments Spark Legal Investigation, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 11, 2001,
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk. A civil liberties group in Ireland accused the Catholic
Church that its recent statement on homosexual relationships offends Ireland’s law that prohibits
hate speech. See Mike Wendling, Vatican Homosexuality Document May Conflict With Irish Law,
CNS NEWS, August 20, 2003 available at http://www.crosswalk.com. See also Paul E. Rondeau,
Selling Homosexuality to America, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 423,449 2001-02) (explaining the
technique used by gay rights advocates that portrays “all detractors as victimizers.”); William C.
Duncan, Symposia Homophobia in the Halls of Justice: Sexual Orientation Bias and Its Implication
Within the legal System: Sexual Orientation Bias: The Substantive Limits of Ethic Rules, 11 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 85, 96-97 (2003) (referring to a situation where the state attorney was
called a “homophobic” for arguing to uphold the laws in the State of Massachusetts favoring the
traditional definition of marriage; David Orgon Coolidge & William Duncan, Definition or
Discrimination? State Marriage Recognition Statutes in the “Same-Sex Marriage Debate,” 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 3, 26 (1998) (suggesting that deliberation and debate on the issue must take
place with dignity).
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the liberationists and the liberals have no trust in the possibility of
engaging in an objective discussion about the human person, his
expectations, his authentic and profound needs, his duties.”186 The real
battle against the traditional monogamous and heterosexual model of
marriage, then, is a struggle against the idea that there is no objective
truth or natural interpersonal union that the law should recognize,
formalize, regularize, protect and support.187 How can the Canadian
government resolve this conflict? Is there any way to defend the truth of
the human person, a truth that has been recognized and reaffirmed
throughout history by all the great cultural traditions and religious
systems in the world?
One avenue of discussion is the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (hereinafter “UDHR”).188 The UDHR stands as a truly
universal statement based on the “common conscience of humanity,”189
one in which the peoples and nations of the world went beyond
ideologies to ground rights in the nature of the human person.190 Indeed,
the UDHR does not purport to create rights, but merely recognize and
proclaim universal rights that flow from the inherent dignity of the
human person. In this way, the concept of human dignity is the
interpretive key: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and alienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.”
But how are the notions of human dignity and the human person to
be defined? According to art. 1: “All human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.” From this article, one can reasonably argue that the human

186. D’Agostino, supra note 176, at 88.
187. Id. at 88-89.
188. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 271A (III) U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
U.N. Doc.A/810 (1948).
189. Pontifical Council for the Family, The Family and Human Rights, at
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_family_doc200011
15_family-humanrights_en.html (Nov. 15, 2000) (wherein the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is analyzed and found to be consistent with a Christian anthropological perspective of the
human person). Indeed, despite cultural and religious differences, state delegates responded to the
call of reason in the face of “barbarous acts which . . . outraged the conscience of mankind.” G.A.
Res. 271A (III) U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess. at preamble para. 2, U.N. Doc.A/810 (1948).
190. See also Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1153 (1998) (“The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948 is the single most important reference point for cross-cultural discussion of human
freedom and dignity in the world today.”) Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Babel: Thoughts on the
Approaching 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Reverend Thomas J.
Furphy Lecture, DeSales University (1996), at http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/
Glendon.html.
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person is an integral being comprised of physical, psychological,
emotional, and spiritual elements and, further, possesses rights and duties
with regard to others. For its part, the concept of human dignity is a
quality of being that “springs from the excellence of [a human being’s]
very personhood.”191
Hence, the concepts of the human person and human dignity are
capable of definition; they are not empty notions void of meaning, nor
are they completely subjective as defined by the Halpern Court. If
authentic equality is tied to the concept of human dignity, then it is
linked to the very nature of the human person, a free being endowed with
reason and conscience. From reason and human experience, it can be
shown that the human person is born male or female and that this sexual
complimentary allows couples to come together in marriage to form a
family. This human drama is presented in logical sequence in art. 16 of
the UDHR: (1) “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due
to race, nationality or religion,” have the right to marry. (2) Entrance into
marriage is with the “free and full consent of the intending spouses.” (3)
Marriage is the basis of the family, “the natural and fundamental group
unit of society, and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”192
191. Thomas Williams, The Question of Human Dignity, CATHOLIC DOSSIER, July/August
2000, available at http://www.catholic.net/rcc/Periodicals/Dossier/2000-08/article3.html. Professor
Williams states the following on the topic of human dignity:
The Latin word dignitas, from the root dignus (worthy, deserving), means in the first
place worth, worthiness, or desert; and, in the second place, the grandeur, greatness, or
excellence that is the cause for the effect. This two-tiered meaning has been carried over
into English, where dignity denotes “an excellence deserving esteem or respect.” Thus a
person of high rank or position is said to possess a dignity, an excellence that merits
special regard. In this case, dignity is superadded to the notion of personhood, and
distinguishes one person from the another. It is commonly thought, however, that there is
a dignity proper to the human person as such. Such a dignity would spring from the
excellence of his very personhood, and would make all men worthy of a particular regard
not due to other creatures. Embodying both “excellence” and “worth,” dignity forms a
sort of “bridge concept” that spans the gap from the metaphysical/anthropological sphere
of what man is to the ethical sphere of how man should therefore be treated.
Id. (emphasis added).
192. Emphasis added. To suggest that the UDHR is an appropriate point of encounter is not to
ignore contentious issues within the international human rights arena, including the basic questions
concerning human rights (What are they? What is their origin? Do they have limits?) which
frequently involve differences pertaining to understandings of man and society, opportunistic
interpretations of various rights, practical problems in application, and so forth. As Mary Ann
Glendon notes, the UDHR founders anticipated these problems and deliberately grounded the
document in an ultimate value, human dignity. They then integrated certain limitations in the
document, which was itself to be read as an integral whole. Glendon argues that many people do not
understand the UDHR, which has been erroneously interpreted as a list of unrelated rights,
something that was never intended. She traces its history in an effort to show the original beauty of
the Declaration as envisioned by civil law jurist René Cassin. She explains:
Cassin often compared the Declaration to the portico of a temple. (He had no illusions
that the document could be anything more than an entryway to a future where human
rights would be respected). He saw the Preamble, with its eight “whereas” clauses, as the
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2. Authentic meaning of marriage
This brings us to an essential point in the discussion: Same-sex
unions cannot be recognized in law as marriage because the relationship
of same-sex partners can never be a marriage. Obviously, there are a
myriad of ways for people to live in union with others, and many such
relationships have immense significance while possessing little or no
legal relevance because such unions are fundamentally private.193
Friendship is a perfect example.
Marriage is the union through reproductive-type acts between a man
and a woman who are equal in dignity as human persons but
complementary in their respective masculinity and femininity, for the
procreation and education of children, the good of the spouses, and the
common good of society. As a basic institution of society, marriage is
unique in that it predates the State and is the only institution that can
realize all of its goods simultaneously. Marriage is not institutionalized
because it is an affective union, but rather, because it is a state in life that
has public relevance as something that creates the publicly
acknowledged roles of husband and wife, mother and father.194 Such
status can only be acquired by a formal and public manifestation of free
consent because of the unique human and social significance that
transcends the couple.195
Marriage, then, has an inherently public dimension. It is the
foundation of the family, the fundamental unit in society, where human
sexuality is regulated toward the finality of new human life, where new
citizens learn how to live responsibly and engage in the political process.
This is not simply a cultural or historical reality, but rather, a principle
manifestation of what it means to be human. After all, only human
beings – not animals – are called husband, wife, father, mother, brother,

courtyard steps moving by degrees from the recognition of human dignity to the unity of
the human family to the aspiration for peace on earth. The general principles of dignity,
liberty, equality, and fraternity, proclaimed in Articles 1 and 2, are the portico’s
foundation blocks. The facade consists of four equal columns crowned by a pediment.
The four pillars are: the personal liberties (Article 3 through 11); the rights of the
individual in relation to others and to various groups (Article 12 through 17); the
spiritual, public and political liberties (Article 18 through 21); and the economic, social
and cultural rights (Articles 22 and 27). The pediment is composed of the three
concluding articles, 28 through 30, which establish a range of connections between the
individual and society.
Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 190, at 1163. For a more
in-depth study of the history of the UDHR See also MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW:
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
193. D’Agostino, supra note 176, at 89.
194. Id. at 88-89.
195. Id.
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or sister. And children develop their personality and gender identity by
assumption of family roles created within the institution called
marriage.196 Implicit in this view of marriage is the understanding that
human sexuality is a value of the whole person in his or her biological,
psychological, emotional, ethical, and spiritual reality, expressed in and
through the body by which two persons consummate their marriage and
are able to become mother and father.
This view of marriage contrasts sharply with same-sex relationships
which, in essence, involve participation in non-reproductive-type acts by
members of the same-sex, who are equal in dignity as human persons,
but not complementary qua masculinity and femininity. Lacking this
complementarity, the same-sex couple cannot further the common good
of society by creating and nurturing a new human life in a way worthy of
human dignity. Underlying this approach is the view that human
sexuality in a relationship between persons of the same-sex is not a value
of the whole person since it lacks a central component, namely, the
fundamental biological participation in reproductive-type acts which are
the foundation of the psychological, emotional, and moral reality of the
couple, expressed in and through the body by which they consummate
their marriage and are able to become mother and father. Lastly, while
the gay community may be made up of partners who are raising children,
this fact alone does not render their relationships more “marriage like,”
nor do the loving aspects or long term nature of their bond.
3. The proper role of the State
This brings us to the role of the Canadian government: What should
be the proper socio-political attitude towards same-sex couples?
As mentioned above, according to the UDHR, Article 16, the natural
family is “the fundamental group unit of society is entitled to protection
by society and the State.” In confronting the reality that same-sex
partnerships comprise a mere 0.5% of all couples in Canada, the
Canadian government must appreciate two things: (1) its fundamental
role to provide for the common good; and (2) the need to make
distinctions between tolerance, promotion, and preference. 197
196. Id. at 89.
197. The figures released by Statistics Canada in 2002 indicate that same-sex couples in all of
Canada comprise about 3% (34,200) of 11 million households. The figure represents nearly 3% of
common law couples counted, or about 0.5 % of all couples, both married and common law. The
study indicates that “[f]emale same-sex couples were five times as likely to have children living with
them as their male counterparts. About 15% of the 15,200 female same-sex couples were living with
children compared with only 3% of male same-sex couples.” For the actual study see the 2001
CENSUS: MARITAL STATUS, COMMON LAW STATUS, FAMILIES, DWELLINGS AND HOUSEHOLDS, at
http://www.statcan.ca./Daily/English/021022/d021022a.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). For
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The notion of the common good, as previously discussed, is centered
on the human person as a free and unique being with reason and
conscience, and social in nature. The common good requires those social
conditions which allow the human person to freely develop and flourish.
In this regard, the State is called upon to make assessments about what
will promote authentic human flourishing. Consequently, in realizing the
common good, the State is in the business of making distinctions which
may require the prohibition of a certain behaviours, the toleration of
many others, the promotion of some, and the preference of a few.
In the case of same-sex relationships, tolerance does not involve the
coercive power of the State. This is evident in the decriminalization of
sodomy. Canada, however, has gone well beyond the mere tolerance of
same-sex relationships by promoting them through the extension of
benefits and recognition, in some jurisdictions, of civil unions or
domestic partnerships. One might well argue that preference has been
shown for co-habiting, same-sex couples through the extension of
benefits that have put them on the same par as marriage. If so, does this
mean that the debate over same-sex marriage concerns only a label? The
next section of the paper argues that marriage is not only about benefits.
A lot more is at stake than the mere granting of a title.
4. Summary and implications
Halpern is really promoting the institutionalization of a universal
sexual ethic that offers no workable philosophy for Canadian society. To
find an adequate philosophical compass, Canadian society must return to
authentic notions of man and the state, which necessarily requires the
protection and support of the natural family based on marriage.
V. WHY CANADA SHOULD NOT FOLLOW HALPERN’S LEAD
A. Introduction
There are important reasons why Parliament should not accept
Halpern’s redefinition of marriage to include same-sex relationships.
The Halpern decision offends common sense or human wisdom for a
number of reasons, namely it: (1) denies the difference between opposite
and same-sex relationships, a denial which, in turn, distorts the legal
meaning of equality; (2) it shows a disrespect for the rights of children in
newspaper reports on the study see Erin Anderssen, Same-Sex Census Numbers Due Today, GLOBE
AND MAIL, Oct. 22, 2002, at A1; Mark Hume, 0.5 % of Canadian Couples are Gay, NATIONAL
POST, Oct. 23, 2002, at A08; Chris Bolin, Census includes Gay, Lesbian Households for First Time,
NATIONAL POST, Oct. 22, 2002.
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failing to consider their best interests, both pre-natal and post-natal; (3) it
fails to consider important empirical data and as result ignores the rights
and duties of children; (4) it obscures the meaning of human sexuality
and the natural family, which is the fundamental unit of society; and (5)
put Canadian political order and stability at risk.198
B. Halpern Distorts the Meaning of Equality
1. Equality in fact
The redefinition of marriage to include same-sex unions would give
the same legal status to a partnership which is fundamentally different
from an opposite-sex union since the former lacks the intrinsic public
dimension founded on the complementarity of the sexes and their
capacity to reproduce. 199
198. This paper does not purport to provide every possible argument against same-sex
marriage. For a more comprehensive treatment of the subject, see generally The Marriage Institute,
at http://www.marriageinstitute.ca. See also Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, Marriage a la
mode: Answering the Advocates of Gay Marriage (2003), at http://www.marriageinstitute.ca/image/
mmmode.pdf (last visited March 13, 2004); LYNN D. WARDLE ET AL., MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX
UNIONS: A DEBATE (2003); Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to the Bishops of the
Catholic
Church
on
the
Pastoral
Care
of
Homosexual
Persons
at
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19861001_h
omosexual-persons_en.html (last visited March 13, 2004); The Pontifical Council for the Family,
Family, Marriage and “De Facto” Unions, at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/
pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_family_doc_20001109_de-facto-unions_en.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2000); Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals
to
Give
Legal
Recognition
to
Unions
Between
Homosexual
Persons,
at
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc20030731_ho
mosexual-unions_en.html (June 3, 2003); Conference of Catholic Bishops, Marriage in the Present
Day, at http://www.cccb.ca/ca/Files/marriagemessage.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2003); United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Between Man and Woman: Questions and Answers About
Marriage and Same-Sex Unions, at http://www.usccb.org/laity/manandwoman.htm (last visited Nov.
12, 2003) (offering the Catholic perspective); Daniel Cere, Wars of the Rings: Revisioning Marriage
in Postmodern Culture, MONTREAL GAZETTE, March 30, 2002; Katherine Young & Paul Nathanson,
Keeping it all in the Family, GLOBE AND MAIL, May 2, 2003; Douglas Farrow, Culture Wars are
Killing Marriage, NATIONAL POST, May 2, 2003; Russel Smith, Marriage: Who Needs it Anyway?,
GLOBE AND MAIL, May 14, 2003; Margaret A. Somerville, Put Kid’s Rights Ahead of Gay
Marriage, NATIONAL POST, May 15, 2003 [hereinafter Somerville, Ahead of Gay Marriage]; Claude
Ryan, Les Couples Homosexuals et Le Marriage – Une Décision Qui Doit Être Portée En Appel, LE
DEVOIR, June 12, 2003; Maggie Gallagher, What Marriage is For, 8 WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 4,
2003; Michael Bliss, Politicians Playing With Fire, NATIONAL POST, Aug. 2, 2003; Chantal Hébert,
MPs in a Flap Over Same-Sex Marriage, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 8, 2003, at A-27; Andrew Coyne,
Where’s the Harm in Gay Marriage?, NATIONAL POST, Aug. 9, 2003; Ted Morton, The New Game
of Charter Politics, NATIONAL POST, Sept. 2, 2003; Norman Spector, Marriage Not Gay in France,
GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 9, 2003.
199. See, e.g., Margaret A. Somerville, The Case Against “Same Sex Marriage”: A Brief
Submitted to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, at http://marriageinstitute.ca/
images/somerville.pdf (last visted Apr. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Somerville, The Case Against “Same
Sex Marriage”] (stating that marriage involves public recognition of the spouses’ relationship and
commitment to each other but that recognition is for the purpose of institutionalizing the procreative
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Objections to this line of reasoning usually stress that such a vision
of marriage, (1) effectively disenfranchises all infertile heterosexuals; (2)
does not accord with the reality that many couples choose not to have
children; and (3) ignores the law’s requirement for the consummation of
marriage, not children.
In response to the first objection, there is a fundamental difference
between “the ‘infertility’ of some heterosexual couples and the
‘impossibility’ of all same-sex couples to procreate through same-sex
bonding.”200 Moreover, even when spouses are sterile, reproductive-type
sexual intercourse promotes the wellbeing of the partnership by
reinforcing the one-flesh union whereby the two become one (physically,
emotionally, intellectually, and so forth).201
In answer to the second objection, the fact that couples do not choose
to have children does not change the reality that they engage in
reproductive-type activity. Indeed, one need only reflect upon what
lengths an average couple must go to in order to avoid the procreative
reality of heterosexual bonding.202
Finally, in regard to the third objection, marriage is good for the
spouses, children, and society, and no other institution achieves these
goals simultaneously. Consummation is the confirmation of the two-inone flesh reality, which cannot be mirrored by non-reproductive type
acts.
2. Equality in law
Given that same-sex relationships and marriage are essentially
different, it follows that any re-definition of marriage to include samesex unions on the grounds of equality undermines the legal meaning of
the term “equality”.203 As was discussed in Part II of this paper, the
relationship in order to govern the transmission of human life and to protect and promote the wellbeing of the family that results).
200. Daniel
Cere,
Redefining
Marriage?
A
Case
for
Caution,
at
http://www.marriageinstitute.ca/images/cere.pdf (last vistied Feb. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Cere,
Redefining Marriage?]. See also D’Agostino when he argues that there is no analogy between samesex couples and heterosexual couples “who can be sterile in fact, by choice of the parties, because of
age or due to pathologies.” D’Agostino, supra note 176, at 90.
201. See Robert P. George, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 146-47 (1999) (arguing that the
intrinsic point of sex in any marriage, fertile or not, is the basic good of marriage itself, considered
as a two-in-one flesh communion of persons that is consummated and actualized by acts of the
reproductive-type).
202. Cere, Redefining Marriage? supra note 200 (noting that heterosexual bonding typically
demands the deployment of a significant battery of technological instruments and societal policies
[contraception, abortion, education against teen pregnancy] to contain and constrain its profoundly
procreative nature).
203. Pertinent to the issue are the following comments by Justice McIntyre in the majority
decision of Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 143, 164:
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Supreme Court of Canada is divided as to the proper approach to s. 15(1)
and Halpern represents just one of many possible approaches.
The Canadian Parliament should look to an authentic definition of
equality, which furthers the common good by requiring the State to make
proper distinctions in accordance with justice (i.e., to give each what is
his or her due). As was noted earlier, a key notion of equality is
expressed in the Aristotelian principle that similarly situated persons
should be treated similarly.204 A violation of this principle occurs when
the law treats an individual worse than others who are similarly situated.
While it no longer represents a “fixed rule or formula for the resolution
of equality questions” in Canada, the Aristotelian principle has not been
wholly discarded.205 Indeed, it should be reasserted as an important
component of the notion of equality.
A common argument made against the employment of the
Aristotelian principle in the same-sex marriage debate is that prohibiting
the marriage of gays is similar to prohibiting interracial marriage, a ban
that has for a long time been recognized as unjust. But these two unions
are not similarly situated. First, anti-miscegenation laws had the purpose
and effect of racial segregation and oppression, while marriage laws have
the purpose and effect of providing for the well being of spouses and
society through the procreation, nurturing, and education of children.
Laws concerning marriage do not have as their primary purpose “to
exclude homosexual relationships because they are homosexual.”206 If

Equality is a protean word. It is one of those political symbols—liberty and fraternity are
others—into which men have poured the deepest urgings of their heart. Every strongly
held theory or conception of equality is at once a psychology, an ethic, a theory of social
relations, and a vision of the good society. It is a comparative concept, the condition of
which may only be attained or discerned by comparison with the condition of others in
the social and political setting in which the question arises. It must be recognized at once,
however, that every difference in treatment between individuals under the law will not
necessarily result in inequality and, as well, that identical treatment may frequently
produce serious inequality. This proposition has found frequent expression in the
literature on the subject but, as I have noted on a previous occasion, nowhere more aptly
than in the well-known words of Frankfurter J. in Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162
(1950), at p. 184: It was a wise man who said that there is no greater inequality than the
equal treatment of unequals.
204. See PETER W. HOGG, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 52-14 to 52-15, (Thomson
Carswell, ed., 4th ed. 1997) [herein after HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4TH ED.] (discussing the
similarly situated test). (This text differs from that referenced in note 20, which is a newer edition).
205. See Justice McIntyre giving the majority judgment in Andrews v. Law Society of B.C.,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 168, wherein he holds that the Aristotelian principle “cannot be accepted as a
fixed rule or formula for the resolution of equality questions arising under the Charter. Consideration
must be given to the content of the law, to its purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies,
and also upon those whom it excludes from its application. The issues which will arise from case to
case are such that it would be wrong to attempt to confine these considerations within such a fixed
and limited formula.”
206. Somerville, The Case Against “Same Sex Marriage,” supra note 199.
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there is any discrimination, it is a secondary effect “not desired but
unavoidable, and it is justified or excused by the primary purpose which
otherwise cannot be realized.”207 Second, even if homosexual or lesbian
tendencies have a biological component, there is no evidence to suggest
that there is a “gay gene” that is wholly determinative of the issue
thereby rendering homosexuality or lesbianism an immutable
characteristic like race.208 Third, “same-sex marriage is not singled out
for disfavour.” Society has always disapproved of certain kinds of sexual
relationships, such as those between: (1) adults and children, (2) friends,
(3) certain relatives, (4) persons and animals, (5) one man and more than
one woman (polygamy), or (6) one woman and more than one man
(polyandry).209
Another objection is that the Aristotelian equality principle itself is
wholly deficient in so far as it justifies discriminatory laws against
minority groups. In response, constitutional law expert Peter W. Hogg
argues that the Aristotelian approach is not wrong in principle simply
because it does not provide guidelines with respect to whether or not
persons are similarly situated, or whether or not certain behaviour is
appropriate; rather the principle is valid because any determination of
equality requires a comparison with others but the problem is how to
make more refined determinations.210
Another objection emphasizes that the Aristotelian notion of equality
does not give priority to the way the law makes one feel in terms of the
respect required from others. In response, an authentic understanding of
“equal respect” means appreciating a person qua person, as unique,
irrepeatable, and endowed with reason for the purpose of selfdetermination. The human person has free choice but is subject to
207. Id. (arguing that this type of discrimination is similar to that involved in affirmative
action programs where “the harm it involves, can be justified when it is to achieve a greater good
that cannot otherwise be achieved”).
208. See, e.g., A. Dean Byrd et al., Homosexuality: The Innate-Immutability Argument Finds
No Basis in Science, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, May 27, 2001, at AA6. Byrd, a trained scientist,
clinical psychologist, and Vice President of NARTH, together with Shirley E. Cox, a licensed
clinical social worker, and Jeffrey W. Robinson, a licensed marriage and family therapist conclude
that the innate-immutability argument is “bad science.” For an additional discussion as to whether
there is a “gay gene” see generally http://narth.com. See also the discussion and the accompanying
footnotes under my discussion of the Halpern Court’s failure to address empirical data wherein
various authorities are cited which advocate that there is ample evidence that homosexual attraction
may be diminished and change is possible. See also David O. Coolidge, Should the Government
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage?: Session Two: Legal, Equitable, and Political Issues, 7 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 33, 39 (2000) (suggesting that the gay community knows there is no “gay gene”
but continues to make the argument for rhetorical purposes to set up a “clash between victims and
victimizers” instead of a “clash between view points,” id. at 42).
209. See George Dent, Should the Government Recognize Same-Sex Marriage?: Session Two:
Legal, Equitable, and Political Issues, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 33, 46 (2000).
210. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4TH ED., supra note 204, at 52-13 to 52-15.
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limitations, which in some cases prevent him or her from acting
reasonably because of habit, weakness, or uncontrolled desires and
emotions. Robert P. George, Professor of Law at Princeton University,
argues “Governments are obliged to show respect to persons qua
persons, not to all of the person’s acts and choices.”211 Moreover, any
discussion of equal respect and concern must distinguish between how a
person feels about a law and whether the law is in fact in breach of
equality rights since the former is irrelevant to a determination of the
latter. According to George, even if the legislator were to be “in fact
profoundly contemptuous of the person whom they restrict, and further,
even if they make the attitude well known to him, they have no
significant capacity to injure his self-respect.”212
In the case where a citizen has a propensity for certain conduct
which is prohibited by law and agrees that his conduct is unworthy but
finds it difficult to restrain himself, he might conclude that it is difficult
to retain his self-respect.
But, in this event, damage to the individual’s self-respect is not
properly attributable to the law (or the lawmakers), but to his own
moral failings and his self-awareness of them . . . . His self-respect will
be restored to the extent that he (perhaps assisted by the law) reforms
his character and conforms his conduct to the standard required . . . .213

On the other hand, in the case where a citizen does not accept the law
and finds it “backward, stupid, insensitive, or unjust,” he might express
anger, lobby to repeal the law, or commit acts of civil disobedience, “but,
so long as he regards himself as right and the law as wrong, his sense of
self-respect does not suffer.”214
C. Halpern Fails to Consider the Rights of the Child
The Court in considering the same-sex marriage issue failed to
consider the fundamental rights of children. The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child has achieved near universal
acceptance having been ratified or acceded to by 191 States.215 It is a
legally binding document, which was ratified by Canada in 1992.
According to preambular para. 9, the “‘child, by reason of his physical
and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including
211. ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY
102 (1995) [hereinafter GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL].
212. Id. at 97.
213. Id. at 98.
214. Id.
215. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989).
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appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.’”216 This is a
well established principle in international law, first recognized in the
1959 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child.217
Harkening back to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
another key principle is that found in preambular para. 5 which states
that the family is “the fundamental group in society and the natural
environment for the growth and well-being of its members and
particularly children” (emphasis added). Preambular 6 then adds that “the
child, for the full and harmonious development of his personality, should
grow up in a family environment.”
Logic dictates that same-sex marriage necessarily leads to increased
access to means of artificial reproduction and/or surrogate motherhood in
order that same-sex couples may make up for their biological reality.218
And such couples will likely press “for full access to new assisted
reproductive technologies”219 and the right to produce children in
whatever way they choose.220
Recourse to technology in this manner, however, means that a child
is not received as a gift, that is, as a human being, but as a product
manufactured in a laboratory and/or carried to term out of necessity by a
woman who intends to sever her maternal bond and relinquish the child
to another at birth.
This adult-centered approach to the issues of same-sex marriage and
artificial reproduction violate the fundamental right of children to be
born and raised by their biological mother and father. Indeed, it promotes
an assisted-reproduction industry that undermines the connection
between biological parents and children and thereby reconfigures the
family.221 Same-sex advocate William Eskridge admits as much when he
notes that reconstructing the law according to the gay experience,
involves the reconfiguration of family – de-emphasizing blood, gender,
and kinship ties and emphasizing the value of interpersonal
commitment. In our legal culture the linchpin of family law has been
the marriage between a man and a woman who have children through
procreative sex. Gay experience with “families we choose” delinks
family from gender, blood, and kinship. Gay families of choice are
relatively ungendered, raise children that are biologically unrelated to
216. Id.
217. Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAORSupp. (No.
16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
218. Somerville, The Case Against “Same Sex Marriage,” supra note 199; Cere, Redefining
Marriage?, supra note 200.
219. Cere, Redefining Marriage?, supra note 200.
220. Somerville, The Case Against “Same Sex Marriage,” supra note 199.
221. Cere, Redefining Marriage?, supra note 200.
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one or both parents, and often form no more than a shadowy connection
between the larger kinship groups.

What is required is a more child-centered vision, which includes the
idea that society should continue to function based on the “presumption
that, if at all possible, children have a valid claim to be raised by their
own biological parents.”222 Indeed, human wisdom has shown that a
child “needs a mother and a father and, if possible and unless there are
good reasons to the contrary, preferably its own biological mother and
father as its raising parents.”223 The importance of the biological
connection is supported by the empirical data discussed below and the
human drama of adopted children, or children born from reproduction
technology, who seek to know the identity of their natural parents.224
A common objection raised to this line of argument is that same-sex
couples need to marry for the sake of children who are already being
raised by same-sex parents. In response, one might argue that parents,
children, and society would be better off in both the short and long term
if marriage is not redefined, since such redefinition would: (1)
fundamentally change the understanding of marriage as an institution
that symbolizes an inherently complementary and procreative
relationship; (2) violate the rights of children and lead to increasing
amounts of children created in the laboratory from the genetic patrimony
of multiple parents whom they may never know; (3) reconfigure the
natural family, undermining the biological connection between parents
and children; and (4) treat children in a same-sex relationship as the
general rule rather than the exception.225
In sum, setting the biological model aside in favor of new and
deliberately invented models, which are not in the best interests of the
child, is a form of “social experimentation” that places the burden of
proof on those wishing to carry out such an experiment. Those who wish
to replace the natural family with something else must “show that it is
reasonably safe to do so,” especially in light of the vulnerable persons
involved, namely, children.226
D. Halpern Fails to Consider Important Empirical Data
The same-sex marriage debate inevitably raises arguments that rely
upon scientific evidence. Indeed, empirical data has been used to

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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demonstrate that gay and lesbian life styles are normal and healthy, on
the one hand, or to show that they are abnormal and unhealthy, on the
other hand. As was discussed in Part I of this paper, the court is not the
proper arena to address these complex issues, but nonetheless they have
forged ahead and made important decisions that effectively shut down
the possibility of free and open debate on the matter. In so doing, these
decisions have had the additional effect of marginalizing Canadian
citizens who are seeking treatment for same-sex attraction as well as
those treating them and others advocating or supporting such efforts (i.e.
various religious groups).227
The issue of empirical data has renewed concern when one considers
the rights of children and the correlative duty of Parliament, with the care
over the common good of society (inclusive of all children), to ensure
free and open dialogue with a view to the best interest of the child. In
particular, the Parliament should address a number of questions that were
not addressed in Halpern but have been raised in the scientific
community. The following are just some of the questions which should
be addressed:
1. Does exposure to the gay lifestyle have a negative impact on
children? While some sexual behavior occurring among both
heterosexuals and homosexuals may be diagnosed as having a negative
impact on health and well-being, does “medical and social science
evidence [indicate] that homosexual behaviour is uniformly unhealthy;”
in other words, does “Men having sex with other men [lead] to greater
health risks than men having sex with women, not only because of
promiscuity but also because of the nature of sex among men,” namely
anal cancer and HIV? 228 Is the gay lifestyle associated with
psychological problems; in other words, are gay, and lesbians at an
increased risk of psychiatric illness, and suicidal behaviors?229

227. For the authorities on this point see supra note 184.
228. Medical Downside of Homosexual Behaviour, Zenit News Agency, at
http://www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=41158 (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) (interview
with Dr. Richard Fitzgibbons). See also Homosexuality and Hope, Catholic Medical Association, at
http://www.cathmed.org; John R Diggs, Jr., The Health Risks of Gay Sex, at
http://www.corporateresourcecouncil.org/white_papers/Health_Risks.pdf.
229. Medical Downside of Homosexual Behaviour, supra note 228 (“Two extensive studies
appearing in the October 1999 issue of the American Medical Association’s Archives of General
Psychiatry confirm a strong link between homosexual sex and suicide, as well as a relationship
between homosexuality and emotional and mental problems. One of the studies by David M.
Fergusson and his team, found that ‘gay, lesbian and bisexual young people are at increased risk of
psychiatric disorder and suicidal behaviors.’” In that study, Fitzgibbons notes that youths suffering
from these problems are more likely to suffer from other disorders: major depression (four times
more), generalized anxiety disorder (three times more), conduct disorder (five times more), nicotine
dependence (five times more), multiple disorders (six times), and attempted suicide (six times more).
In addition, Dr. Fitzgibbons discusses a recent study conducted in the Netherlands, (which accepts
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2. Does the absence of either mother or father, in lieu of two women or
two men, have a negative effect on children?230 If there is no definitive
answer because the phenomenon is relatively new, is this something to
which the Canadian community should take a wait and see approach? 231
3. Are same-sex relationships inherently unstable and if so, what is the
effect on children? Isn’t change possible, especially with the assistance
of the medical community, 232 outreach programs like “Courage,” 233 and
the gay lifestyle and has legalized gay marriage), that increased rates of suicide are not attributable
to homophobia, but rather, to higher rates of psychiatric disease commonly associated with same-sex
activity).
230. See Young & Nathanson, supra note 198 (arguing that “[t]hough much more similar than
dissimilar both sexes are distinctive. Boys cannot learn how to become healthy men from even the
most loving mother (or pair of mothers) alone. And girls cannot learn how to become healthy
women from even the most loving father (or pair of fathers) alone. . . . And the problems they reveal
apply not only to gay parents but also to straight single parents. Yes, there have always been single
parents due to death, divorce, or desertion. But these were the exceptions.”).
To name just a few of the studies they cite to prove the ills suffered by children in situations of
absent fathers and/or mothers, see DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING
OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995); Chris Coughlin & Samuel Vuchinich, Family
Experience in Preadolescence and the Development of Male Delinquency, 58.2 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM., 491ff (1998); Robert J. Sampson & J. H. Laub, Urban Poverty and the Family Context of
Delinquency: A New Look at Structure and Process in a Classic Study, 65 CHILD DEV., 523 (1994);
Robert J. Sampson, Urban Black Violence: The Effect of Male Joblessness and Family Disruption,
93 AM. J. SOC. 348 (1987); Ross L. Matsueda & Karen Heimer, Race, Family Structure and
Delinquency: A Test of Differential Association and Social Control Theories, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 171
(1987); George Thomas & Michael P. Farrell, The Effects of Single-Mother Families and
Nonresident Fathers on Delinquency and Substance Abuse, 58.4 J. MARRIAGE & FAM., 884ff (1996);
Lingxin Hao, Family Structure, Private Transfers, and the Economic Well-Being of Families with
Children, 75 SOC. FORCES 269 (1996); FRANK F. FURSTENBERG & ANDREW CHERLIN, DIVIDED
FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART (1991); Adam Shapiro & James
David Lambert, Longitudinal Effects of Divorce on Quality of the Father-Child Relationship and on
Fathers’ Wellbeing, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 397 (1999); Rebekah Lein Coley & P. Lindsay ChaseLansdale, Stability and Change in Paternal Involvement Among Urban African American Fathers,
13.3 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 416 (1999); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF
DIVORCE, (Herpion, 2000); SARA MCLANAHN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE
PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994); PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT
RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL (1997). See also HECTOR FRANCESCHI &
JOAN CARRERAS, ANTROPOLOGIA JURIDICA DE LA SEXUALIDAD, (S.E.A., 2000);
231. Dr. Fitzgibbons argues that the phenomenon is relatively new and “goes against the
values of the common inheritance of humanity.” He emphasizes that studies are available which link
various disorders in children with absent fathers and/or mothers, and that the potential for an
incorrect conclusion, and the consequences that would result, demand further research before any
more changes in law. Medical Downside of Homosexual Behaviour, supra note 228. A similar
argument is made by Dr. Somerville who also contends that statistics show that a child raised
without the benefit of parents of both sexes is deprived of the possibility for complete and normal
development. Somerville, The Case Against “Same Sex Marriage,” supra note 199.
232. See, e.g., National Association for the Treatment and Research of Homosexuality
(NARTH), at http://www.narth.com (last visited Jan. 2004; International Association of Catholic
Medical Association, at http://www.Flamc.org (last visited Jan. 2004); Catholic Medical
Association, at http://www.cathmed.org (last visited Jan. 2004). See also GERARD VAN DEN
AARDWEB, HOMOSEXUALITY AND HOPE (1985); GERARD VAN DEN AARDWEB, ON THE ORIGINS
AND TREATMENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1986); JOSEPH NICOLOSI & LINDA AMES NICOLOSI, A
PARENT’S GUIDE TO PREVENTING HOMOSEXUALITY (2002); JOSEPH NICOLOSI,OMOSESSUALITÀ
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the support of others (i.e. religious communities, family friends,
recovering gays and lesbians and so forth)?234 If so, how are children
affected by changes from straight relationships to gay relationships and
vice versa? Are homosexual relationships shorter in duration and less
monogamous, on average, than heterosexual relationships?235 If so, what
are the effects of these two factors on children?
E. Halpern Obscures the Meaning of Human Sexuality and the Natural
Family
The bedrock of all human rights is the universal principle that the
human person is an end in himself/herself and can never be used as a
means. By giving same-sex relationships marital status, the Canadian
government would be accepting a notion of human sexuality that
obscures the significance of the inherent dignity of the human person and
his or her fundamental social unit – the natural family.
The true dignity of the human person requires that he or she be
treated as a whole, as a physical, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual
MASCHILE, UN NUOVO APPROCIO (Sugarco Edizioni, 2002) (original title in English: REPARATIVE
THERAPY OF MALE HOMOSEXULAITY: A NEW CLINICAL APPROACH; DAVID MORRISON, BEYOND
GAY (1999) (providing a personal testimony on Christian conversion and the struggle with
homosexual attraction).
233. See JOHN F. HARVEY, THE TRUTH ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY: THE CRY OF THE FAITHFUL
(1996). John Harvey, a Catholic priest and founder of the organization “Courage,” has been helping
persons with a homosexual orientation to live chaste lives for almost twenty years. He refuses to
label people “homosexual” or “lesbian” and insists that human beings share something more
fundamental: every human being is equal because he or she is created in the image and likeliness of
God and, by His grace, may enter into eternal life, that is, union with God. In his book, The Truth
about Homosexuality, Harvey argues that even a person who has never deliberately chosen a samesex orientation may change “through deliberate choice of the means of change found in the order of
nature and of divine grace.” Id. at 72-73. In his comprehensive study of the issue, he devotes an
entire chapter to “The Possibility of Change of Orientation” in which he cites the work of numerous
experts who have devoted their lives to the treatment of same-sex attraction and believe change is
possible. Id. at 69.
234. On this point, a recent book by former gay activist David Morrison is revealing. In
Beyond Gay, Morrison outlines how he experienced his first same-sex affair at age 13 or 14 and
went on to identify himself with the gay community. Ultimately, however, he made the decision to
change and live with same-sex attraction while refusing to be defined by it. In regard to whether or
not change is possible, his comments are revelatory: “This, then, is the reason for the book: To give
witness to the truth about same-sex attraction and activity both as they are expressed in theology and
philosophy and as I have found them in my life and observed them in the lives of my friends. By
drawing from an understanding about human nature that is defined in both dogma and daily life, I
hope to reveal a humanity that goes deeper than mere sexual inclination. There is so much more to
life than sex. Our stage as human beings is so much larger if we would but open our eyes.”
MORRISON, supra note 232, at 24.
235. See, e.g., Amy Fagan, Study Finds Gay Unions Brief, THE WASH. TIMES, July 11, 2003, at
A01 (discussing various studies including a study by Dr. Maria Ziridou showing that men in
homosexual relationships have, on average, eight partners a year outside their steady relationships.
See also, footnote 245, and in particular the work of NICOLOSI, supra note 232, at 97-99, who argues
that promiscuity is a fundamental part of same-sex attraction disorder.
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being. In some activities, individual males and females are complete in
and of themselves, for example, when they eat, speak, or think. But
reproduction requires a man and woman to communicate through a
bodily union.236 In other words, marriage is the physical union or two-inone flesh communion of persons that are complementary. Such sexually
reproductive-type acts reaffirm the couple’s communion whether or not
they are capable of conceiving children.237 Only reproductive-type acts
can be “truly unitive, and thus marital” since reproduction is the only act
that is performed by the married pair as an organic whole. 238
Common objections to this line of reasoning often include the
following: (1) many non-reproductive-type sexual acts, including
sodomy, can achieve personal union because they are an expression of
love or pleasure; and (2) using the body as an instrument is not
dehumanizing or offensive to human dignity because, as human persons,
we are obliged to do so, as in the case of eating and drinking.239
With respect to the first objection, if non-marital sexual acts were
merely expressions of love or pleasure, then sexual acts between (1) an
adult and a child, (2) an animal and a human being, or (3) a father and
daughter would be irreproachable. In regard to the second objection,
activities such as eating, drinking, or chewing gum greatly differ from
sexual intercourse where passions are intense, the action is completely
focused, and another person is integrally involved. 240 All of which, in
addition to human weaknesses (i.e., selfishness, pride and so forth), play
into the temptation to reduce persons to a fragment of their total reality –
merely the physical component. 241
236. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 139-53, 161-83 (1999)
[hereinafter GEORGE, IN DEFENCE OF NATURAL LAW].
237. Id. at 140-41.
238. Id. at 141. George admits that this vision of the human person carried to its logical
conclusion means that an entire range of sexual acts offends the person’s human dignity since these
gratifications are private experiences not directed toward interpersonal unity or communion: sodomy
(anal and oral sex between married couples and unmarried couples and between persons of the samesex), masturbation (mutual or solitary), pre-marital sexual intercourse, adultery, and contracepted
sexual intercourse, even between married couples. In other words, these acts do not embody the
personal communion which not only requires marriage, a stable personal relationship that rejects the
notion that persons are substitutable or interchangeable, but reproductive-type acts initiating and
renewing procreative power through real organic union. Id. at 171, 175. See also John Finnis, The
Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical
Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1997) [hereinafter Finnis, The Good of Marriage].
239. See Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261, 261300 (1995); Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to John Finnis, 9
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 56 (1994).
240. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW, supra note 236, at 168 (Sexual acts are not just
signs or symbols of cordiality, such as a smile or handshake, but are acts that intensely engage the
participants).
241. While the institution of marriage does not eliminate one spouse from using or abusing the
other, it certainly militates against the problem. Professor John Finnis notes that marriage, the
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F. Halpern Undermines the Social Order
The judicial redefinition of marriage is a fundamental change, and
one that is wrong because any such redefinition requires the special
amendment procedures, or at the very least the intervention of
Parliament. When courts exceed their jurisdiction in so important a
policy question, their legitimacy as a judicial body is put into question.
The failure to respect special amendment procedures also undermines the
Canadian democratic system when established procedures are not
followed.
There is an important rationale for the special procedures that govern
Constitutional amendments. As Professor Lederman argues they “are of a
fundamental kind, made directly by custom, precedent an practice over
significantly long periods. Underlying custom, precedent and practice are
of course the established expectations of the people about the process.”242
Quite appropriately he acknowledges that expectations may change
incrementally through time but for fundamental changes “the special
amendment process does accordingly require a degree of democratically
mandated consent, well-distributed across the regions of this broad and
somewhat loose-jointed country.”243
Moreover, the notion of democracy “implies basic tenets which are
the core of its very existence.”244 In other words, authentic democracy
entails agreement on fundamental values about life in common, values
which are discoverable through reason; a democratic society is not
simply a neutral system in which all possible conceptions of life compete
for public acceptance. To proclaim, as did the UDHR, that the natural
family is the fundamental unit of society means that it is a universal
value, which has been recognized, asserted, and protected by various
cultures and traditions from time immemorial; that the natural family
exists prior to the State and must therefore be respected and protected by
the State; and that any rejection of the natural family as this fundamental
unit constitutes a complete restructuring of human relationships which
will inevitably result in social disorder..
exclusive commitment of a lasting nature, has strong implications for the integrity and
reasonableness of sexual activity. He further, observes: “Those who propound gay ideology or
theories of same-sex marriage or ‘sexual activity’ have no principled moral case to offer against
(prudent and moderate) promiscuity, indeed the getting of orgasmic sexual pleasure in whatever
friendly touch or welcoming orifice (human or otherwise) one may opportunely find it in.” Finnis,
The Good of Marriage, supra note 238, at 133.
242. EGALE, Written submissions of the Intervenor, The Interfaith Coalition for Marriage,
supra (quoting W.R. LEDERMAN, CONTINUING CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS, 91 (1981)).
243. Id.
244. JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 99 (1951) [hereinafter MARITAIN, MAN AND
THE STATE].
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Lastly, the Halpern Court accepted the argument that gay marriage is
necessary for the self-esteem of a minority, namely gay couples. The
fundamental line of reasoning is that life is intolerable “merely by virtue
of being in the minority.”245 This position, however, undermines the very
meaning of democracy, which “by definition, consists of both a majority
and one or more minorities,” 246 and necessarily operates on the
assumption that minorities will politically organize to meet their own self
interests but not with total disregard for the needs of the society at
large.247
In sum, to accept the Halpern redefinition of marriage is to accept a
fate articulated by lawyer and scholar Iain Benson: “Citizens of Canada
no longer live in a democratic society. The illusion of democracy
continues, but the reality is that major decisions regarding fundamental
matters are no longer made by elected officials.”248 Indeed, authentic
democracy is possible only in a State, which respects the rule of law
founded on a true conception of the human person and his and her human
dignity, which is integrally tied to the natural family based on marriage.
When objective truth does not guide and direct government, Pope John
Paul II aptly points out, “then ideas and convictions can easily be
manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy
without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised
totalitarianism.”249
245. Young & Nathanson, supra note 198, at 13-14.
246. Id. (arguing that this line of thinking implies that any single person should succumb to
serious self-loathing, and expect the State to cure the problem, or at the very least, confer on the
suffering person his or her self-esteem).
247. Id. at 20.
248. Iain Benson, Canadian Courts Impose Rule By Law (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
249. Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Centesimus Annus, available at
http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0214/_P7.HTM (May 1, 1991). See also Raymond De Souza,
Religious Voices Belong in the Public Square, NATIONAL POST, August 7, 2003 (stating,
The more erudite National Post editorial board approved of those who said the Vatican
should butt out.’ Butt out? Sticking its nose into ‘the business of state’? Who would have
thought that a church speaking on marriage would be accused of trespassing on
exclusively secular territory? But that is the consequence of a state that grows ever larger,
inserting itself into more and more sectors of social life and civil society. The totalitarian
impulse demands that wherever the state advances, the churches and everyone else must
retreat.”);
Smolin, supra note 164, at 143-44 (defining totalitarianism:
Totalitarianism can be said to involve an attempt to place all aspects of the life of a
people under a control of a centralized political authority. Totalitarianism is particularly
hostile to independently functioning intermediary institutions and association, such as
religious groups, labor unions, and independent media or academic institutions that might
form an alternative source of association, organization, loyalty or authority.
Totalitarianism seeks political control of the total life, individual and collective, private
and associational, of human beings. Totalitarianism thereby attempts to equate the State
with the entire civil society, and subsumes the ‘nation’ within the State. Totalitarianism
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has explored the legal and policy-related reasons behind
the same-sex marriage debate. We have seen that marriage is a
fundamental Canadian institution protected in the Canadian Constitution.
However, the philosophical underpinnings of Canadian federalism (i.e.,
the Christian view of man and society, the notion of unity and diversity,
the principle of the common good, and the principle of subsidiarity) have
gradually eroded leaving Canadian society adrift in a sea of subjective
opinion with no adequate vision of the human person to serve as
foundation for its legal system. Approaches to same-sex marriage in
Canada reveal the poverty of the liberal and libertarian perspectives
which reduce the richness of the human being to the subjective
framework of “self-esteem and self respect.”
The Canadian parliament must return to a more objective notion of
the human person in the fulfillment of its primary task to legislate for the
common good. Only in this way can the whole truth of the human person
remain at the core of legal and political analysis, as well as Canadian
parliament deliberations concerning the redefinition of marriage. To this
end, the parliament must take as its first premise that heterosexual
marriage and same-sex marriages are radically different and, hence, to
treat them the same as the Halpern Court did: (1) distorts the true notion
of marriage, and undermines the meaning of equality, (2) offends the
dignity of children, (3) overlooks important studies which relate to the
rights of children, (4) obscures the meaning of human sexuality and the
natural family, and (5) disturbs the social order.
In light of the above reasons and the accompanying harm that would
be caused to Canadian society, all parliamentarians of good will should
conclude that there is no authentic liberty claim that can be advanced to
justify the redefinition of marriage.

tends not to perceive proper boundaries or limitation to the political; in this sense, the
political becomes quasi-religious (even if in the form of a ‘secular’ ideology), in that it
comprises the sphere of ultimate concern. Totalitarianism, whether of the right or of the
left, views its political mission as the ultimate good; we might call it a form of political
messianism.)

